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Owning Nothingness: Between the Legal  
and the Social Norms of the Art World 
Guy A. Rub* 
Almost $8 million—that is what the Crystal Bridges Museum paid 
for one work of contemporary art in November 2015. What did that 
museum get for that hefty sum? From a legal perspective, absolutely 
nothing. The work it purchased was just an idea, and ideas of this kind 
escape legal protection. 
Despite this lack of legal protection, the social norms of the art world 
lead large, sophisticated, experienced, and legally represented institutes to 
pay millions of dollars for this type of work.  This Article is one of the first 
in legal scholarship to examine at depth those norms in this multibillion-
dollar industry. It does so by, inter alia, reporting on interviews the author 
conducted with industry insiders concerning their practices. This Article 
suggests that those norms create property-like rights in all artworks, 
whether or not they are legally protected, as well as an ongoing right of 
artists to partly control the use of their works. Those social norms fill a 
gap between the ways in which the contemporary art world understands 
creativity and the ways in which our legal system actually incentivizes 
creative endeavors. 
This Article analyzes the normative implications of these social norms 
and the gap they fill. First, it explains how those norms incentivize certain 
forms of creativity in a way that is more effective and efficient than 
 
*   Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. I would like 
to thank the curators, museum administrators, and other industry insiders who agreed to 
discuss their work with me, as well as Brian Frye, Laura Heymann, Amalyah Keshet, Efthimi 
Parasidis, the participants of the Intellectual Property Scholars Conference (IPSC) at Cardozo 
Law, Penn State Faculty Workshop, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law Faculty 
Workshop, the Junior IP Scholars Association (JIPSA) workshop at Northwestern School of 
Law, the Law & Technology Workshop at Tel-Aviv University Faculty of Law, and the 
Advance Topics in IP Workshop at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem for their valuable 
comments; Matthew Krsacok and Jordan Powers for outstanding and indispensable research 
assistance; and The Center for Interdisciplinary Law and Policy Studies at The Ohio State 
University for financially supporting this study. The study reported in this Article was 
approved by The Ohio State University’s Office of Responsible Research Practices. The 
remaining errors are, of course, my own. 
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property rights. Second, going beyond the art world, the Article shows 
how the social norms expose certain hidden assumptions in copyright 
authorship and their shortcomings. It suggests how the law can be 
improved to account for the richer description of creativity this Article 
provides. Third, the Article contributes to the ongoing debate concerning 
private property ownership. The art world provides sellers with significant 
post-sale control over their works in a way that the law commonly finds 
undesirable. That tension might justify rethinking the current legal rules 
that disincentivize post-sale control. 
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Almost $8 million—that is what the Crystal Bridges Museum 
paid for one work of contemporary art in November 2015.1 What 
did that museum get for that hefty sum? From a legal perspective, 
absolutely nothing. 
In its official announcement of the acquisition, the museum 
described the work, by the renowned conceptual artist Felix 
Gonzalez-Torres, as “small, green candies wrapped in cellophane 
[that] are spread across the gallery floor, so that viewers may touch, 
take, and consume the work, which can be endlessly replenished.”2 
But what does that mean from a legal perspective? 
The museum did not purchase any chattel because there is 
none. As the announcement of the acquisition makes clear, every 
time the work is installed, candies are placed on the gallery floor 
only to be taken by viewers and be replenished by the museum. The 
original candies that the artist used are long gone. The museum also 
did not purchase any intangible legal rights. The only such right 
that comes to mind is copyright.3 However, nobody can seriously 
claim that copyright law protects the notion of placing green 
candies on a gallery floor for viewers to take. That is nothing more 
than an idea, and ideas are not protected by copyright.4 
The Crystal Bridges Museum is not the only museum that paid 
a small fortune for buying “rights” in artwork that the law does not 
recognize.5 Considering that conceptual art is one of the most 
 
 1. Kelly Crow, Christie’s Sells $331.8 Million of Art, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 10, 2015, 
10:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/christies-sells-331-8-million-worth-of-art-1447212399. 
 2. Crystal Bridges Museum of American Art Acquires Artwork by Felix Gonzalez-Torres, 
CRYSTAL BRIDGES MUSEUM AM. ART (Nov. 16, 2015), https://crystalbridges.org/blog/crystal- 
bridges-museum-of-american-art-acquires-artwork-by-felix-gonzalez-torres. 
 3. See infra notes 131–34 and accompanying text. 
 4. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2018) (“In no case does copyright protection . . . extend to any 
idea . . . .”); see also infra Section II.D (explaining why this and similar works are unprotected 
and in the public domain). 
 5. See, e.g., infra note 72; see also Colin Gleadell, Tino Sehgal: Invisible Art Worth £100k, 
TELEGRAPH (May 7, 2013, 12:27 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/art/art-
news/10041272/Tino-Sehgal-Invisible-art-worth-100k.html (describing the purchase of a 
Tino Sehgal work by The Museum of Modern Art in New York); Zoë Lescaze, How Does a 
Museum Buy an Artwork That Doesn’t Physically Exist?, N.Y. TIMES STYLE MAG. (Nov. 8, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/t-magazine/tino-sehgal-hirshhorn-museum-art.html 
(exploring the ways in which the Hirshhorn Museum and other institutes purchase and 
handle works that have no tangible existence, focusing on the works of Tino Sehgal, which 
 
001.RUB_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/5/20  9:52 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
1150 
 
influential art movements in the last fifty years,6 it is hard to find a 
respectable museum with a decent contemporary art collection that 
does not claim to “own,” or at least “borrow” such nothingness.7 
This conundrum—the willingness of large, sophisticated, 
experienced, and legally represented institutes to pay millions of 
dollars and to engage in transactions over legal nothingness—is the 
driving force of this work. The solution to that puzzle and the 
answer to the question about what the Crystal Bridges Museum 
and similar institutions purchase for millions of dollars is not found 
in any statute, legal rule, or caselaw. It is rooted in the social norms 
of the art world. To explore those norms, and the gap between them 
and our legal framework, I conducted interviews with industry 
insiders and studied multiple industry-related publications and 
reports.8 The result is an account of the norms of this multibillion-
dollar industry. 
While our legal system incentivizes multiple forms of creativity, 
this Article explains that there is a gap in that legal framework 
which is especially pertinent to the art world. Indeed, some forms 
of creativity, specifically concerning ideas, are left unprotected and 
seemingly under-incentivized.9 However, the legal norms of the art 
world—including those that require museums to pay for legal 
nothingness—effectively provide those incentives. Therefore, 
extending copyright law protection is unnecessary.10 
The impacts of the social norms this Article explores go beyond 
the art world. Those norms expose and question our legal 
framework for protecting creativity and its hidden underlying 
assumptions, as well as broader and controversial notions 
regarding authorship and even ownership. The Article shows how 
 
consist of actors interacting with museum visitors); Elise Taylor, The $120,000 Art Basel 
Banana, Explained, VOGUE (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.vogue.com/article/the-120000-art-
basel-banana-explained-maurizio-cattelan (discussing a work of the conceptual artist 
Maurizio Cattelan, titled Comedian, that consists of a banana taped to a wall, and was sold to 
three buyers, each paying $120,000 or more for it; on December 7, 2019, an installation of the 
work at Art Basel Miami was famously eaten, without authorization, by the performing artist 
David Datuna). 
 6. See, e.g.,  Lisa S. Wainwright, Conceptual Art, BRITANNICA, https://www. 
britannica.com/art/conceptual-art (last visited Feb. 19, 2020); see also Justin Wolf, Conceptual 
Art, ART STORY (OCT 1, 2012), https://www.theartstory.org/movement/conceptual-art/. 
 7. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 157–59. 
 8. See infra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra notes 221–30 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra notes 232–40 and accompanying text. 
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existing copyright law rules, especially those concerning 
authorship, might be too narrowly focused. It therefore suggests 
how those rules can be modified to take into account the richer 
description of creativity that this Article provides.11 The Article 
concludes by providing a new angle to an ongoing and heated 
debate concerning the nature of private property ownership itself.12 
It suggests that the legal perception of ownership is likely too 
narrowly construed and that a more holistic approach—one that 
takes into account developments outside of the legal system—
might improve the law. 
*** 
This Article proceeds in four parts. The first two parts introduce 
the gap between the contemporary art world and the legal system 
that purports to support and incentivize creativity. They explain 
how contemporary artists push the boundaries of creativity in an 
attempt to challenge the art world, but in doing so, they also 
undermine core principles in our legal system. 
Part I briefly introduces certain developments in the art world 
during the last century and focuses on the emergence of conceptual 
art, one of the most consequential developments in that period.13 
Conceptual art is an art form that questions the nature of art itself. 
As such it constantly pushes the boundaries of the definition of 
art.14 As the name suggests, conceptual art focuses on the concept, 
or idea, behind an artwork, and not on the execution of that idea. 
This led to the so-called dematerialization of artworks.15 Many 
conceptual artists take the centrality of ideas to the next logical step: 
If only ideas matter, those artists ask, why should they bother to 
create tangible artwork at all? They, therefore, create artwork that 
is nothing more than pure ideas. Felix Gonzalez-Torres’s work, 
with which this Article opens,16 is an example of an artwork whose 
entire value is in its idea (placing candies on the museum’s floor) 
 
 11. See infra Section IV.C. 
 12. See infra Section IV.C. 
 13. See Wainwright, supra note 6. 
 14. See infra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 15. The phrase was first coined in Lucy R. Lippard & John Chandler, The Dematerialization 
of Art, ART INT’L, Feb. 1968, reprinted in CHANGING: ESSAYS IN ART CRITICISM 255 (1971). 
 16. See supra text accompanying notes 1–2. 
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and not its execution (actually placing them). Part I examines some 
of those works and explains how conceptual artists, like Gonzalez-
Torres, are able to powerfully comment on important 
developments in our society—the AIDS epidemic in the case  
of Gonzalez-Torres—by creating works that are, in essence, just 
pure ideas.17 
Part II examines the other side of the law-art gap by focusing on 
the legal system. Specifically, it introduces the ways in which the 
law protects and incentivizes creativity and why conceptual 
artworks commonly escape such protection, becoming legal 
nothingness. The two main ways by which the law protects and 
incentivizes creativity are personal property law and copyright 
law. Those regimes work in tandem to provide different forms of 
protection for different works.18 Some creators, including most fine 
artists, at least before the twentieth century,19 produce unique 
authentic goods, which are protected by private property rights. 
Those creators earn a living primarily by selling their ownership 
interest in those goods.20 Other creators, such as book authors and 
recording musicians, produce goods, such as manuscripts and 
master recordings, that are not considered to be authentic or hold 
special intrinsic value.21 Those creators generate income by selling 
copies of their creations. Copyright law is designed to address the 
economic reality that those creators face and the relevant market 
failures. In other words, the law allows them to generate income by 
exclusively controlling the creation of new copies.22 
This framework applies to tangible objects, like books, 
paintings, and sculptures, but not to ideas. The standard account of 
intellectual property law theory is that ideas, at least if they are 
 
 17. See infra Section I.C. 
 18. I briefly explored the different modes of creativity commercialization and legal 
protection in my previous work, especially in Guy A. Rub, The Unconvincing Case for Resale 
Royalties, 124 YALE L.J. F. 1, 4–5 (2014). 
 19. This Article uses the terms “fine art” and “visual art” interchangeably to refer to 
the type of art that is typically presented in a single copy in museums. This is a rather narrow 
definition but, for the most part, it follows the legal definition of the term “work of visual 
art,” as used within the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). See also infra notes 120–23 and 
accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra text accompanying notes 96–97. 
 22. See infra text accompanying note 99. 
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public, can only be protected by patents.23 Ideas that do not meet 
the high threshold of patentability are therefore unprotected and 
free for the taking.24 
Part II concludes by analyzing the ways in which conceptual art 
challenges core notions and hidden assumptions in the law.25  
It shows that the very same choices that conceptual artists make in 
an intentional attempt to expose and undermine the art world’s 
preconceptions also challenge existing legal norms. While 
conceptual artists focus on generating creative ideas and consider 
the execution of those ideas trivial and uninteresting, copyright law 
makes the exact opposite assumption concerning creativity: it 
expects the heart of a work and its main source of value to be in its 
expression and not ideas.26 This mismatch makes copyright law an 
inadequate tool for incentivizing and protecting conceptual art. 
Similarly, while the notion of pure-idea artworks might free artists 
from the shackles of tangible expression and allow them to focus 
their creative energy on developing ideas, it turns their work into 
legal nothingness. 
Indeed, pure-idea works fall between the cracks of our legal 
framework for protecting creativity. They are unprotected by 
copyright and are not subject to personal property rights. As a legal 
matter, they simply cannot be owned. If they cannot be owned, they 
cannot be sold. If they cannot be sold, how are conceptual artists 
expected to make a living? 
The answer to that question, as Part III explains, is that the 
social norms of the art world provide all artists, including 
conceptual artists, with powerful rights with respect to their 
creations. Those norms allow artists to get paid for their works and 
to partly control their future use, whether those works are legally 
protected or not. To better understand those norms, I studied 
industry publications and interviews with artists, curators, and 
 
 23. Non-public ideas can be protected by other legal norms, such as trade secrets. See 
Arthur R. Miller, Common Law Protection for Products of the Mind: An “Idea” Whose Time Has 
Come, 119 HARV. L. REV. 703 (2006) (exploring the legal doctrines that protect confidential 
ideas); infra text accompanying notes 224–29. 
 24. See, e.g., Clark D. Asay, Intellectual Property Law Hybridization, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 
65, 65, 75–76 (2016) (“[P]atent law aims to incentivize the production of inventive ideas,  
while copyright focuses on protecting the original expression of ideas, but not the underlying 
ideas themselves.”). 
 25. See infra Section II.D. 
 26. See infra text accompanying note 127. 
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other industry insiders. In addition, I conducted my own 
interviews with industry insiders and reviewed agreements 
entered into by their institutes.27 
Part III separates the rights that the social norms provide to 
artists into two main (related) categories. First, according to those 
norms, artists initially own every work they come up with, whether 
or not a tangible object was created. The artists are therefore 
granted what this Article calls pseudo personal property rights (or 
pseudo-ownership) even in pure ideas.28 Section III.A analyzes the 
nature of those socially created property-like rights. Those rights 
initially vest with the artists, but they can be transferred, including 
by sales and loans, to others. At the heart of this regime is the social 
norm, shared by all industry insiders I spoke with, that no museum 
or gallery will ever present a work unless it is the work’s (pseudo) 
owner, or the work is on loan from the (pseudo) owner. Otherwise, 
such a work is considered fake. 
Because museums and galleries will not present any 
dematerialized artwork unless they pseudo-own it (or it is on loan 
from the pseudo-owner), there is only one copy of the work 
presented at any given time.29 The result is that the idea that forms 
a work, which is, by its nature, non-rivalrous (i.e., can be enjoyed 
by many simultaneously) becomes rivalrous: only one entity may 
“possess” it at any given time. While the work is presented at 
Alice’s gallery, Bruce’s gallery will not present it. This important 
norm thus creates artificial scarcity which allows artists to earn 
income by selling their works—their pseudo-ownership rights.30 
Second, a separate but related set of social norms allows artists 
to exercise a certain level of control over the use of their works, even 
after they are sold.31 Indeed, the art world recognizes an ongoing 
connection between artists and their works. Specifically, the art 
world gives artists a right to be consulted concerning the ways their 
works are presented and a right to affect the authentication of what 
 
 27. See infra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 28. See infra Section III.A. 
 29. See infra text accompanying note 153. 
 30. See infra text accompanying note 153. 
 31. See infra Section III.B. 
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is perceived to be their works.32 The law too arms artists with a 
certain post-sale control, both through copyright law and the Visual 
Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA).33 This Article compares and 
contrasts the nature of the social norms to the legal norms, and 
finds the first to be more flexible and context sensitive.34 
Interestingly, the art world often uses legal terminology to describe 
its social norms.35 This inaccurate use of legal terms—sometimes to 
describe legal nothingness—might be a way for the industry to give 
even greater legitimacy to its norms.36 
Part IV examines the normative implications of these social 
norms and how they should inform the development of the law on 
three fronts. First, this Article suggests that the social norms of the 
art world fill a gap in our legal framework, which does not 
incentivize the creation of certain public ideas.37 Indeed, the social 
norms regime operates mostly in a negative space where creativity 
exists without IP protection.38 They incentivize creativity in a way 
that is effective, flexible, and likely superior to any property 
 
 32. Authenticity means more than just determining whether works were actually 
created by a certain artist, but it takes into account additional factors such as whether the 
artist feels that the works still represent her artistic vision. Artistic authenticity, which plays 
a significant role throughout this Article, has received limited attention in legal scholarship, 
although that attention has been growing in recent years. See, e.g., Amy Adler, Why Art Does 
Not Need Copyright, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 313, 342–51 (2018); Derek Fincham, Authenticating 
Art by Valuing Art Experts, 86 MISS. L.J. 567 (2017); Laura A. Heymann, Dialogues of 
Authenticity, 67 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 25 (2015); Sonia K. Katyal, Technoheritage, 105 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1111 (2017). In other fields, and especially in art history research and in philosophy, 
authenticity is a major topic of study. See also infra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 33. Codified in 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2018). 
 34. See infra Section III.C. 
 35. See infra text accompanying note 162. 
 36. See infra text accompanying note 162. 
 37. See infra Section IV.A. 
 38. The term “negative space” was famously coined in Kal Raustiala & Christopher 
Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. 
REV. 1687, 1764 (2006). In recent years, creative social norms in various industries were 
explored in the copyright literature. See, e.g., CREATIVITY WITHOUT LAW: CHALLENGING THE 
ASSUMPTIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Kate Darling & Aaron Perzanowski eds., 2017) 
(exploring several case studies in which creativity exists in industries that either do not offer 
copyright protection, or offer it in limited scope); Stephanie Plamondon Bair & Laura G. 
Pedraza-Fariña, Anti-Innovation Norms, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1069, 1136 (2018) (exploring the 
recent social norms scholarship in all areas of IP law); Robert Spoo, Courtesy Paratexts: 
Informal Publishing Norms and the Copyright Vacuum in Nineteenth-Century America, 69 STAN. 
L. REV. 637 (2017) (examining how social norms of the publishing industry protected foreign 
literary works); infra note 231 and accompanying text. 
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norms.39 In other words, this gap in our legal framework  
should not be addressed by the legal system, but by the pertinent 
industry itself. 
Second, the social norms shed light on the nature of copyright 
authorship, its underlying assumptions and their shortcomings, 
and the ways to improve it. When a work is created by a group of 
individuals, which is common, identifying the one who is initially 
entitled to copyright protection—that is, the author—is one of the 
main challenges of copyright law.40 Courts have developed tests 
that typically grant authorship to those who control the fixation—
that is, the execution—of a work.41 Those tests have become highly 
controversial in recent years both domestically and internationally, 
as they arguably unfairly reward some, like producers, while 
excluding others, like actors or vocalists.42 
This Article contributes to this heated debate. In the context of 
conceptual art, the one who controls the execution of the work 
might not be the artist who came up with an idea, but a curator who 
executed it.43 Elevating curators to be authors is, of course, absurd. 
Indeed, the analysis shows that copyright law’s notion of 
authorship might be too narrow. This Article, therefore, provides 
support to those who call for a more holistic approach to 
authorship.44 It explains how the law may be modified to account 
for this possible shortcoming.45 
 
 39. See infra text accompanying notes 232–40. 
 40. See infra text accompanying notes 241–43. 
 41. See, e.g., Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding that 
the movie producer and director is the sole author and not an actor); 16 Casa Duse, L.L.C. v. 
Merkin, 791 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that a producer and not a director is the author); 
Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a director and not an 
advisor on set is the author). 
 42. See, e.g., Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, World Intellectual Property 
Organization, June 24, 2012,  https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/avp_dc/ 
avp_dc_20.pdf; infra text accompanying notes 249–51. The topic of authorship also attracted 
much attention from legal scholars in recent years. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon 
Parchomovsky, Copyright Trust, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1015, 1035–37 (2015); Christopher 
Buccafusco, A Theory of Copyright Authorship, 102 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1234–35 (2016); Dan L. 
Burk, Owning E-Sports: Proprietary Rights in Professional Computer Gaming, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
1535, 1550 (2013); Margot E. Kaminski & Guy A. Rub, Copyright’s Framing Problem, 64 UCLA 
L. REV. 1102, 1124–27 (2017). 
 43. See infra text accompanying notes 259–61. 
 44. See infra note 249. 
 45. See infra text accompanying notes 262–63. 
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Third, this Article offers a new angle to an old problem: Can 
sellers of chattel restrict their buyers’ use thereof? This question 
goes to the heart of our understanding of personal property 
ownership. While it has intrigued legal scholars for centuries,46 the 
issue has attracted a growing attention in recent years.47 The 
reasons for that renewed interest have to do with developments in 
the law—especially as a result of recent Supreme Court decisions 
which broadly interpret rights in chattel (at the expense of 
intellectual property rights)48—and the emergence of new models 
of ownership in the marketplace, empowered by modern 
technologies, such as those offered by the sharing economy.49 
What is often missing from this debate is the impact of social 
norms on the perception of private property ownership.50 This 
Article starts to fill this gap by noting that the art world 
demonstrates how an industry can create flexible property-like 
rights over sold goods.51 Those rights provide the artists-sellers 
with broad post-sale control over the use of their works, in a way 
that is in tension with the legal norms, which often disfavor such 
control. This Article, therefore, suggests that it might be prudent to 
 
 46. See infra note 264. 
 47. See infra text accompanying note 265. 
 48. Impression Prods., Inc., v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1527 (2017) (holding 
that a purchaser can resell patented items “because those are the rights that come along with 
ownership”); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 530, 551 (2013) (holding that 
personal property rights allow importation and resale of copyrighted works purchased 
abroad because “full ownership of a lawfully-made copy authorizes its owner to dispose of 
it freely”  (quoting H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION pt. 
5,  at 66 (Comm. Print  1965))); see also Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Reconciling 
Intellectual Property and Personal Property, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1211, 1211–12 (2015) 
(discussing the tension between “ownership of the copyright” and “ownership of the copy”); 
Guy A. Rub, Rebalancing Copyright Exhaustion, 64 EMORY L.J. 741, 760–62 (2015) (discussing 
how the common law notion of chattel should affect modern copyright law). 
 49. See, e.g., Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection 
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 80 Fed. Reg. 65944, 65953–55 (Oct. 28, 2015) 
(codified, as amended, at 37 C.F.R. § 201.40(b)(9)  (2019)) (considering whether car ownership 
entails a right to circumvent the software installed in the vehicle); Dave Fagundes, Why Less 
Property Is More: Inclusion, Dispossession, and Subjective Well-Being, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1361, 
1380–94 (2018) (examining how the sharing economy, among others, challenges the notions 
of exclusion and possession of chattel); infra text accompanying notes 278–80. 
 50. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 121–25 (2d ed. 2006) (explaining that 
human behavior is typically shaped by four forces: the law, the market, the architecture (i.e., 
technical and physical constraints), and social norms). 
 51. Infra Section IV.C. 
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rethink the inflexibility of the legal norms concerning private 
property ownership.52 
I. THE SUBJECT OF LEGAL NOTHINGNESS:  
CONCEPTUAL DEMATERIALIZED ART 
This Article focuses on the gap between the legal norms that 
encourage creativity and the current social norms of the art world. 
This Part provides the readers with a brief introduction to one side 
of this gap: the contemporary art world. It focuses on the 
conceptual art movement and especially the notion of 
dematerialized artworks—works that are nothing more than pure 
ideas. Scholars of contemporary art have published hundreds of 
books and articles about this movement, and this Part cannot 
explore that vast literature. Instead, it provides the necessary 
background to understand the discussion and the legal analysis 
that follows. 
Defining conceptual art might be more than nontrivial or 
difficult. It might be impossible. I could not find a truly satisfactory 
definition.53 That failure might not be a failure at all. Conceptual art 
rose as an anti-formalistic movement that opposes boxing art in a 
formalistic, scientific, or empirical way.54 Avoiding an exact 
definition is, therefore, more of a feature of conceptual art than a 
bug. Nevertheless, the next few pages introduce conceptual art and 
its contribution to the art world. Section A discusses the readymade 
movement, which, in many respects, is the predecessor that led to 
the emergence of conceptual art. Section B examines some of the 
 
 52. Infra Section IV.C. 
 53. See also TONY GODFREY, CONCEPTUAL ART 12 (1998) (“[T]here has never been a 
generally accepted definition of Conceptual art, though many have been proposed.”). 
 54. See, e.g., Joseph Kosuth, Art After Philosophy, 178 STUDIO INT’L 134 (1969), as 
reprinted in CONCEPTUAL ART: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 158, 165 (Alexander Alberro & Blake 
Stimson eds., 1999) (explaining that conceptual art rejects attempts to define art through 
formulas, or by using aesthetic considerations). 
It is worth noting that copyright law perceives art in a formalistic way that is antithetic 
to the notions of contemporary art. For example, the extrinsic test, as used by many courts to 
consider if a work is infringing on another, “compares the objective similarities of specific 
expressive elements in the two works.” Skidmore v. Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1064 (9th Cir. 
2020) (en banc). The test “depends . . . on specific criteria which can be listed and analyzed.” 
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 
1977). In other words, the fact finder is expected to analytically dissect the work to its 
elements and to analyze them in an objective or scientific way. As explained above, 
conceptual artists do not perceive art as something that can be analyzed in this way. 
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main features of conceptual art. Section C uses the work of Felix 
Gonzalez-Torres to demonstrate how conceptual artists can create 
works that are powerful and moving and yet consist of ideas. 
A. The Historic Predecessor of Conceptual Art: Readymade 
While the term “Conceptual Art” originated in a 1961 essay by 
the philosopher Henry Flynt,55 and even though the movement 
gained momentum and a central place starting in the late 1960s,  
its origins are earlier than that. As this section explains, it can be 
traced to cubism and more importantly to the readymade school  
of the 1910s. 
Those movements, much like conceptual art, focused on 
exploring “what is art.” This exploration included, among other 
things, using objects or industrial products that were not normally 
considered artistic. In 1912, Pablo Picasso may have been the first 
renowned artist to do this when he pasted a printed image of a chair 
and an industrial rope to a canvas as part of his cubist work Still 
Life with Chair Caning.56 The readymade movement is, however, 
commonly identified with the artist that many consider to be the 
founding father and the main inspiration for conceptual art: Marcel 
Duchamp. As the famous conceptual artist Joseph Kosuth noted, 
“All art (after Duchamp) is conceptual . . . .”57 
One narrative that runs through much of 
Duchamp’s work is questioning and pushing 
the boundaries of the art world.58 In 1917, for 
example, he purchased a urinal, turned it on its 
back, placed it on a pedestal, signed it as 
“R.Mutt 1917,” and named it Fountain.59 He 
then submitted it to the first annual exhibition 
of the Society of Independent Artists.60 The society originally 
 
 55. Henry Flynt, Concept Art, in AN ANTHOLOGY OF CHANCE OPERATIONS (La Monte 
Young ed., 1963) (defining conceptual art, in an essay that gave the movement its name, as 
the antithesis to “structure art”). 
 56. See RICHARD LEWIS & SUSAN I. LEWIS, THE POWER OF ART 401 (2nd ed. 2008). 
 57. Kosuth, supra note 54, at 164. 
 58. THOMAS MCEVILLEY, THE TRIUMPH OF ANTI-ART 16–29 (2005). 
 59. GODFREY, supra note 53, at 28. But see ZING TSJENG, FORGOTTEN WOMEN: THE 
ARTISTS 114 (2018) (suggesting that Fountain was actually created by Elsa von Freytag-
Loringhoven and not Duchamp). 
 60. GODFREY, supra note 53, at 28. 
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promised to accept every work of art, but, once it received Fountain, 
it questioned whether this was art at all. The work—later 
considered one of the most important and influential works of the 
twentieth century—was not shown in the exhibition.61 
B. From Readymade to Conceptual Art 
Like readymade, conceptual art is an art form about art and 
artistic meaning.62 It builds on earlier inquiries about the nature of 
art, such as those of Duchamp’s readymade movement, but, as 
further explained below, it pushes them, and the boundaries of the 
art world, even further. 
The conceptual art movement stresses certain notions that will 
be important for the discussion in later parts of this Article. Like the 
readymade movement (and other early twentieth century 
movements in modern art), conceptual art devalues artistic 
craftsmanship.63 Pre-twentieth-century art centered on artistic 
skills. Indeed, it is hard to look at a Rembrandt or a Van Gogh 
painting and not appreciate the masterful way in which those 
artists used oil paint. As the twentieth century progressed, the focus 
of artistry shifted.64 Picasso was a gifted and skillful painter, but 
when he created Still Life with Chair Caning, he chose to paste a 
printed image of a chair, instead of drawing one, which did not 
require any special skills. Duchamp took the notion further. Many 
of his works, including Fountain, do not require any special skills, 
at least not the type of artistic skills that is being taught in a drawing 
or a sculpturing class. Conceptual art similarly typically does not 
require special skills. In fact, conceptual artists often stress that their 
works are intentionally simple to execute.65 
 
 61. Id. at 28–29. 
 62. See, e.g., Arthur R. Rose, Four Interviews, ARTS MAG., Feb. 1969, at 22, 23 (quoting 
Joseph Kosuth) (“Being an artist now means to question the nature of art. If one is 
questioning the nature of painting, one cannot be questioning the nature of art; if an artist 
accepts painting (or sculpture) he is accepting the tradition that goes with it. . . . If you make 
paintings you are already accepting (not questioning) the nature of art.”). 
 63. JOHN A. PARKS, UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES OF ART 50 (2015) (“With the advent of 
modernism, craft has become increasingly divorced from the fine arts. . . . With Conceptual 
Art . . . the importance of craftsmanship disappears altogether.”). 
 64. Id. 
 65. See, e.g., Lippard & Chandler, supra note 15, at 257 (describing “highly conceptual 
art” as including “monotonal or extremely simple-looking painting and totally ‘dumb’ 
objects” because they “demand more participation by the viewer”). 
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As the value of artistic craftsmanship was significantly 
declining, the importance of the work became attributable to 
another component—the ideas it embodies. As the important 
conceptual artist Sol LeWitt explained, “[i]n conceptual art the idea 
or concept is the most important aspect of the work.”66 
Many conceptual artists took this notion to its logical 
conclusion. If the value of the work lies in its idea, then artists 
should devote their artistic energy to creating ideas, and, possibly, 
nothing more. This led to a phenomenon that Lucy Lippard and 
John Chandler famously called “The Dematerialization of Art” in 
which “the object[] becom[es] wholly obsolete.”67 Therefore, in 
creating dematerialized artworks, artists do not produce any 
tangible object. Instead, they come up with a set of simple 
instructions. Those who present the work, mostly museums and 
galleries, follow those instructions and create what is commonly 
known as “an installation” of the work.68 
C. The Work of Felix Gonzalez-Torres 
To demonstrate how art can be both meaningful and 
dematerialized, this section explores the work of Felix Gonzalez-
Torres, including his candy-based works, like the one with which 
this Article opens. 
Felix Gonzalez-Torres was born in Cuba in 1957. In 1979, he 
moved to New York City, where he lived and worked until his 
death from complications related to AIDS in 1996.69 The 
Guggenheim museum described Gonzalez-Torres’s work as 
“[e]mploying simple, everyday materials . . . and a reduced 
aesthetic vocabulary . . . to address themes such as love and loss, 
 
 66. Sol LeWitt, Paragraphs on Conceptual Art, ARTFORUM , June 1967, at 80 (explaining 
that “[i]n conceptual art the idea or concept is the most important aspect of the work” and 
that “the execution is a perfunctory affair”);  see also GODFREY, supra note 53, at 4 
(“Conceptual art is not about forms or materials, but about ideas and meanings.”); infra 
Section II.D (returning to LeWitt’s explanations and analyzing the significant legal 
implications thereof). 
 67. Lippard & Chandler, supra note 15, at 255. 
 68. Some even classify this type of work, which is installed and not just presented like 
a painting or a statue, installation art. See CLAIRE BISHOP, INSTALLATION ART 6–8 (2005). 
 69. NANCY SPECTOR, FELIX GONZALEZ-TORRES: AMERICA 62–63 (2007). 
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sickness and rejuvenation, gender and sexuality.”70 Gonzalez-
Torres was not only one of the most critically acclaimed and heavily 
researched and discussed conceptual artists, but he was also one of 
the most popular and commercially successful visual artists, both 
in his lifetime and thereafter.71 Nowadays, Gonzalez-Torres’s 
works are sold for millions of dollars72 and they continue to intrigue 
commentators from multiple disciplines.73 
Some of Gonzalez-Torres’s most famous works, including  
his most commercially successful pieces, consist of installations  
of candies. In exploring these works and the legal questions they 
raise, this Article focuses on one such work: “Untitled” (Portrait of 
Ross in L.A.). 
“Untitled” (Portrait of Ross in L.A.) consists of 175 pounds of 
candies. The work, as created by Gonzalez-Torres in 1991, is 
nothing more than a set of general instructions on how to exhibit 
those candies. According to those instructions, the candies are to be 
individually wrapped in multicolor cellophane.74 Visitors to the 
exhibit, the instructions continue, are invited to take candies  
 
 70. Felix Gonzalez-Torres, GUGGENHEIM, https://www.guggenheim.org/artwork/ 
artist/felix-gonzalez-torres (last visited Feb. 19, 2020); see also Randy Kennedy, Tough Art 
with a Candy Center, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/07/ arts/ 
design/07bien.html. 
 71. Felix Gonzalez-Torres, supra note 70 (listing several fellowships that Gonzalez-
Torres won and many of his shows exhibited before and after his death). 
 72. Kyle Chayka, Candy Sells for $4.5 Million at Philips de Pury Auction, HYPERALLERGIC 
(Nov. 9, 2010), https://hyperallergic.com/12202/candy-sells-philips-de-pury (reporting on 
a sale of a Gonzalez-Torres work for $4.5 million); Leslie Newell Peacock, High-priced Candy: 
“Untitled” (L.A.) Acquired by Crystal Bridges, ARK. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2015, 5:44 PM), 
https://www.arktimes.com/RockCandy/archives/2015/11/16/high-priced-candy-
untitled-la-acquired-by-crystal-bridges (reporting on a sale of another Gonzalez-Torres work 
for $7.67 million); Revolt of the Rich?, ARTNET (May 11, 2011), http://www.artnet.com/ 
magazineus/news/artmarketwatch/sothebys-2001-spring-contemporary-sale-5-11-11.asp 
(reporting on a sale of Gonzalez-Torres prints for $1.65 million). 
 73. There are quite a few examples from recent years that demonstrate the tremendous 
interest in Gonzalez-Torres and his work, including multiple new books, articles, and 
exhibitions. See, e.g., ELENA FILIPOVIC ET AL., FELIX GONZALEZ-TORRES: SPECIFIC OBJECTS 
WITHOUT SPECIFIC FORM (2016); ROBERT STORR ET AL., FELIX GONZALEZ-TORRES (Julie Ault 
ed., 2d ed. 2016); Eduardo M. Peñalver & Sergio Muñoz Sarmiento, Law in the Work of Félix 
González-Torres, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 449 (2017) (introducing a small symposium on 
Gonzales-Torres); M.H. Miller, A Colossal New Show Revisits a Conceptual Art Icon, N.Y. TIMES 
STYLE MAG. (May 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/11/t-magazine/art/felix-
gonzalez-torres-zwirner-new-york-show.html (covering a large-scale new exhibition of Felix 
Gonzalez-Torres work at David Zwirner Gallery). 
 74. JONATHAN D. KATZ & DAVID C. WARD, HIDE/SEEK: DIFFERENCE AND DESIRE IN 
AMERICAN PORTRAITURE 224 (2010). 
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with them. The owner of the space—typically a museum—is 
allowed to replenish the candies every day if it chooses to do so, or 
it can let them disappear.75 The instructions do not dictate the shape 
or arrangement of the candies. 
Gonzalez-Torres named all his works “Untitled,” but, in 
parentheses, he included more telling titles. In this case, “Ross” 
refers to Gonzalez-Torres’s longtime life partner, Ross Laycock, 
who died of complications related to AIDS in 1991.76 The candies 
might therefore represent the 
sweetness of their relationship.77 The 
weight, 175 pounds, was Ross’s 
weight when he was healthy, and the 
taking of the candies by the exhibit’s 
visitors represents the dwindling of 
his body as he was fighting AIDS.78 
One can suggest that the taking of the 
candies by the public points to the 
shared responsibility of the American public at large in  
allowing the AIDS epidemic to take such a high toll on the gay 
community at the time.79 Finally, the replenishment of the candies, 
if the exhibit owner chooses to do so, might represent the circle of 
life and death.80 
Indeed, “Untitled” (Portrait of Ross in L.A.) is an example of a 
powerful and socially meaningful work that consists of nothing but 
ideas that can be simply executed. With simple instructions on how 
to use candies, Gonzalez-Torres was able to comment on both his 
private relationship with his life partner and on society’s treatment 
of the gay community during the AIDS epidemic crisis. 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. RENATE LORENZ, QUEER ART: A FREAK THEORY 136–37 (2012). 
 77. KATZ & WARD, supra note 74, at 224; Stephanie Eckardt, The New Met Breuer Wants 
You to Take Candies, Not Photos, W MAGAZINE (Mar. 13, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://www. 
wmagazine.com/story/felix-gonzalez-torres-candy-the-met-breuer. 
 78. Eckardt, supra note 77. 
 79. KATZ & WARD, supra note 74, at 224. 
 80. Id. While this is the common explanation of the work, Gonzalez-Torres, like most 
conceptual artists, rarely provided detailed explanations of his works. See, e.g., NANCY 
SPECTOR, FELIX GONZALEZ-TORRES 11 (1995) (explaining that conceptual artists believe that 
“meaning does not fully reside in authorial intentions”); LeWitt, supra note 66, at 79 
(criticizing “the notion that the artist is a kind of ape that has to be explained by the  
civilized critic”). 
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II. THE LEGAL NOTHINGNESS: RIGHTS IN CONCEPTUAL ARTWORKS 
In this Part, this Article moves from the powerful, inspiring, 
and thought-provoking art to the corresponding legal norms. 
Specifically, this Part explores the legal framework in which fine 
artists operate, and how it fits, or does not fit, conceptual art. This 
Part claims that just as contemporary artists question long-held 
notions of the art world, they similarly challenge existing legal 
norms, and by doing so they shed light on certain hidden 
assumptions in our legal system and their possible shortcomings. 
Creativity, in general, is supported by two property regimes: 
private property law and intellectual property law, and in 
particular copyright law. Section A examines the role of private 
property rights in incentivizing creativity. Section B explains why 
some forms of creativity cannot effectively use private property 
rights and instead rely on intellectual property protection.  
Section C explains that while copyright is typically used to prevent 
free and unrestricted reproduction, it can at times also be used just 
to control certain post-sale use of works, which is common for 
visual artists. 
After this Article explores both conceptual art (in Part I) and the 
legal framework for incentivizing creativity (in sections A through 
C of this Part), section D analyzes the gap between the two, which 
is one of the driving forces of this Article. It explains why the legal 
framework does not work for conceptual artists, and how their 
choices challenge our legal system. 
A. The Role of Personal Property Rights in Protecting Fine Art 
Personal property law recognizes rights in chattels.81 As 
personal property rights are typically transferable, the law fosters 
trade and forms the basis for significant parts of our economy.82 
This rather trivial notion allows many industries—some more 
creative than others—to operate effectively. Carpenters, for 
example, buy wood and nails and use their talent and time to create 
 
 81. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 796 (2nd ed. 2005). 
 82. Frank H. Easterbrook, Contract and Copyright, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 953, 954 (2005) 
(“[Property rights] force the parties to the bargaining table, where the Coase Theorem takes 
over and assets are deployed to their highest and best uses. . . . Property rights plus free 
contracting make this possible.”). 
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furniture. The law, of course, recognizes their property rights in the 
furniture, which means that others are excluded from taking or 
using them without the carpenter’s permission.83 Carpenters can 
sell those rights and use the proceeds to cover the costs associated 
with the creation of the furniture. If the proceeds do not cover the 
carpenter’s costs, the standard economic theory suggests that some 
changes will need to be made: the carpenter will need to reduce the 
costs, raise the prices, or look for another line of employment. 
The same reasoning that applies to carpenters applies to many 
other manufacturers and industries. Importantly, it also applies to 
fine artists. Pablo Picasso, for example, purchased a large canvas 
and oil paints, and used his talents, skills, and time—twenty-four 
days to be exact—to create Guernica, which, in 1938, he sold to the 
Spanish government for 200,000 francs.84 That source of income 
should have allowed Picasso to cover his costs, or else, like any 
other producer, he should have either reduced his costs, increased 
his prices, or changed profession. This is the heart of the economic 
model that fine artists work under—one that I elsewhere called a 
“single copy business model”85: they create unique physical goods 
and earn a living by selling them. 
Copyright protection is, therefore, not needed under this single-
copy business model. While, as further discussed in section C, 
Picasso’s works are protected by copyright, this is not the main 
source of income for him and most visual artists.86 Indeed, from this 
perspective, there is little difference between Pablo Picasso and a 
carpenter. They both produce goods and sell them. They do not 
work in a lawless environment. Both primarily rely on personal 
property law (as well as other legal norms such as those rooted in 
contract law) to support their activities. 
 
 83. SINGER, supra note 81, at 796–97. 
 84. A Journey Through the Exhibition: Guernica, NAT’L GALLERY OF VICT., 
https://www.ngv.vic.gov.au/picasso/education/ed_JTE_ITG.html (last visited Feb. 19, 
2020). Other sources, however, note that the work was not sold to the Spanish government, 
but commissioned by it. Guernica, 1937 by Pablo Picasso, PABLO PICASSO, https://www. 
pablopicasso.org/guernica.jsp (last visited Feb. 19, 2020). 
 85. Rub, supra note 18, at 4. 
 86. See Adler, supra note 32, at 335–37 (suggesting that the income of artists from 
selling reproductions and derivative works is insignificant). But see Brian L. Frye, Art Law & 
the Law of the Horse 6 (Dec. 10, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (available at ssrn.com/ 
abstract_id=3085632) (noting that copyright allows some artists to sell reproductions of  
their works). 
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B. From Private Property to Intellectual Property:  
Authenticity as a Substitute for Copyright 
Considering that visual artists do not need copyright law, why 
does the law provide such a protection to creators? To better 
understand how different types of creators use different legal 
mechanisms, and why some of them rely primarily on private 
property law while others depend mostly on copyright law 
protection, this section introduces the notion of authenticity. This 
concept, which will play an important role throughout this Article, 
significantly impacts both the economics of creativity and the legal 
framework that supports it. 
If visual artists can make a living without relying on copyright, 
can the same be said about other creators? Can J. K. Rowling follow 
in Picasso’s footsteps? Can she buy materials—a notepad and ink 
or a laptop—invest her talent and time in creating an artistic 
artifact—a manuscript—in which she will certainly have personal 
property rights, and sell that artifact to cover her costs? The answer 
is, unfortunately, no. In a non-IP world, most book authors would 
likely not be able to cover their fixed costs,87 even when the social 
value of their work outweighs those costs. 
There is a fundamental difference between a Pablo Picasso 
painting and a J. K. Rowling manuscript. Consumers get to enjoy 
Rowling’s work by reading copies of it while they get to enjoy 
Picasso’s work by examining the original artifact that was created 
by Picasso. A copy of Picasso’s work that was created by others, 
even if visually identical, is considered a poor substitute for 
Picasso’s work, as it lacks authenticity—a concept that plays a 
significant role in the art world and in this Article.88 
 
 87. Rub, supra note 18, at 5. 
 88. For a discussion on authenticity in legal scholarship, see sources cited supra note 
32. While the discussion of authenticity in legal scholarship is limited, the topic receives 
significant attention outside of legal scholarship. See, e.g., MEGAN ALDRICH ET AL., ART AND 
AUTHENTICITY (Megan Aldrich & Jos Hackforth-Jones eds., 2012); DAVID A. SCOTT, ART: 
AUTHENTICITY, RESTORATION, FORGERY (2016); RICHARD TODD, THE THING ITSELF: ON THE 
SEARCH FOR AUTHENTICITY (2008); WALTER BENJAMIN, THE WORK OF ART IN THE AGE OF 
MECHANICAL REPRODUCTION (1935), reprinted in ILLUMINATIONS 217 (Hannah Arendt ed., 
Harry Zohn trans., 1968) (1955). 
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Consider, for example, the alleged actions of Tatiana Khan. 
Khan, a gallery owner in Los Angeles, paid $1,000 to commission 
from an unknown local artist a copy of a famous Picasso drawing.89 
Khan then presented this copy as an authentic Picasso, which 
allowed her to claim it was worth $4–5 million. She sold it for a 
“bargain” price of $2 million. Neither the buyer nor his experts 
noticed it was not an authentic Picasso. The forgery was discovered 
years later.90 
The story demonstrates how economically valuable 
authenticity is.91 The market for fine work can contain both a 
$4,000,000 authentic Picasso drawing and a $1000 visually identical 
copy because there is little substitution between the two. Buyers in 
this market perceive those two works as completely different. As 
the notorious forger Han van Meegeren noted after being caught, 
“Yesterday this picture was worth millions of guilders, and experts 
and art lovers would come from all over the world and pay to see 
it. Today it is worth nothing, and nobody would cross the street to 
see it for free.”92 The famous art critic Martin Gayford noted that 
“Discovering a work is a fake is like discovering a friend has been 
lying to you for years.”93 
 
 89. The details about the story are taken from the federal criminal complaint that was 
filed against Khan. Complaint, United States v. Khan., No. 10-0030M, 2010 WL 326207 (C.D. 
Cal. Jan. 7, 2010). 
 90. Id. 
 91. This Article takes consumers’ preferences as a given. Therefore, it does not focus 
on why we consume visual art by observing original artifacts in museums while we are 
satisfied with consuming non-original copies of books (as well as music, movies, and more). 
This question is left to future work. Moreover, the Article focuses on the current reality. The 
significance of “copying” and “authenticity” can and does change over time. The music 
industry, for example, saw a gradual decrease in income from selling copies—albums and 
tracks—while it experienced a significant increase in income from live performances. GLYNN 
LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT’S EXCESS 173 (2018). Live performances, much like a Picasso painting, 
are authentic and cannot be replicated by third parties, which makes them mostly immune 
to piracy. Technology also plays a crucial role. Indeed, it is possible that buyers would be 
indifferent between original authentic work and a good-quality copy, but creating those 
copies is not technically feasible. That was, for example, the state of the book industry before 
the invention of the printing press. Therefore, it is not surprising that copyright law was not 
needed and did not exist at the time. Peter K. Yu, Of Monks, Medieval Scribes, and Middlemen, 
2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1. It is possible, therefore, that preferences, including preferences 
concerning visual art consumption, will change over time. 
 92. MAGNUS MAGNUSSON, FAKERS, FORGERS AND PHONEYS 93–94 (2006). 
 93. Martin Gayford, Art Forgeries: Does It Matter if You Can’t Spot an Original?, 
TELEGRAPH (June 17, 2010, 1:59 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/art/art-features 
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This “aura of authenticity,” as Walter Benjamin famously called 
it,94 is why Picasso does not need copyright. If the relevant market 
attributes the value of an artifact to the identity of the person who 
created it, then all a creator needs are personal property rights in 
that artifact, together with legal protection against forgeries (i.e., a 
prohibition on fraud). Because Pablo Picasso was the only one who 
could have created authentic Picassos and because only authentic 
Picassos can be sold for millions of dollars, the mere ownership 
interest in the tangible creation allowed Picasso to extract much of 
the value of his work from his buyers.95 
Books, as well as many other forms of creativity, operate under 
a different economic reality and employ a different business model. 
I elsewhere called it a “multi-copies business model.”96 The concept 
of authenticity, for the most part,97 does not exist when it comes to 
books. Consumers of books—readers—are typically quite satisfied 
with copies. The fact that J.K. Rowling did not personally create a 
certain copy of Harry Potter does not significantly detract from the 
value the reader places on it. 
The fact that copies of the manuscript of Harry Potter are close 
to perfect substitutes for the manuscript itself has an enormous 
 
/7824999/Art-forgeries-does-it-matter-if-you-cant-spot-an-original.html (discussing an 
exhibition about famous art forgeries at the National Gallery in London). Stories of art 
forgery are not rare. The history of fine art includes multiple examples of works that were 
purchased for a small fortune and later turned out to be forged or fake, which caused them 
to lose practically all their value. The stories of art forgers incite the imagination of authors 
and have been the subject of multiple movies, books, and articles, from Orson Welles’s last 
movie F for Fake to the successful TV series White Collar. See also Leila A. Amineddoleh, Are 
You Faux Real? An Examination of Art Forgery and the Legal Tools Protecting Art Collectors, 34 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 59, 92–97 (2016) (exploring famous art forgeries in recent decades). 
 94. BENJAMIN, supra note 88, at 220; see also Adler, supra note 32, at 344. 
 95. Authenticity, however, is a vague notion that can be subject to multiple meanings. 
As Laura Heymann points out, we use the word in various contexts—from “authentic Italian 
sauce,” to “authentic Napa Valley wine,” to an authentic folk singer, to “an authentic 
Rembrandt.” Heymann, supra note 32, at 29–32. In each of those contexts, the meaning of the 
word authentic is different. At best, we can hope that the term has a stable meaning within a 
certain context, but even that is not always the case. An authentic Van Gogh painting is 
understood to mean a painting that was physically painted, from scratch to finish, by Van 
Gogh. But an “authentic Warhol” might have been painted by someone working at Andy 
Warhol’s studio, maybe under Warhol’s supervision. For the purpose of this Article, it is 
enough to note that while this uncertainty exists at the margin, nobody will perceive the 
work of a forger that has nothing to do with the artist as an authentic work of the artist. 
 96. Rub, supra note 18, at 4. 
 97. Authentic items in this model might have value as collectors’ items. However, that 
value, even if it exists, pales in comparison to that of the copies of the work. Rub, supra  
note 18, at 4. 
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impact on the market in which authors operate. On the one hand, 
it allows many more readers to access the work. Thus, this feature, 
which economists call non-rivalry in consumption,98 has the 
potential to be a great source of social good. On the other hand, the 
fact that it is possible to create almost perfect substitutes through 
copying means that the social value of an author’s creativity is 
detached from the value of the manuscript. In other words, the 
social value of the work is misaligned with personal property law. 
Even in a world with well-developed and well-enforced personal 
property rights, practically all book authors will not be able to 
generate significant income from their rights in tangible artifacts: 
that is, the manuscripts they create. Those authors—unlike 
carpenters and painters—should not decide whether to stay or 
leave the market based on the value of those physical goods. 
This is a market failure—one that economists call a public  
goods failure99—that copyright law mitigates.100 If authors’ rights 
were limited to personal property rights—that is, if they had rights 
over their manuscripts, but not over the creation of copies thereof—
they could have recovered only a tiny fraction of the social value of 
their creation. The market will, therefore, under-incentivize their 
creation, and too many potential authors will either leave the 
market or not enter it in the first place. Copyright law addresses 
this failure by creating a legal exclusivity over the creation of 
copies.101 This exclusivity allows authors to earn income under the 
multiple-copies business model. 
 
 98. See  Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, 
in NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 614–17 (1962). 
 99. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of 
the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1610–11 (1982). 
 100. Id. The fact that visual artists do not need copyright led some to argue that 
copyright law discriminates against them. See, e.g., Shira Perlmutter, Resale Royalties for 
Artists: An Analysis of the Register of Copyrights’ Report, 16 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 395, 403 
(1992). Shockingly, a few years ago, the U.S. Copyright Office joined that faulty logic. U.S. 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, RESALE ROYALTIES: AN UPDATED ANALYSIS 1, 31 (2013), https:// 
www.copyright.gov/docs/resaleroyalty/usco-resaleroyalty.pdf. As I discussed elsewhere, 
Rub, supra note 18, at 3–7, and as further clarified in this section, this argument misstates the 
role of copyright in mitigating market failures concerning some types of creativity. 
Naturally, copyright does not need to fix what is not broken. Fine artists do not need 
copyright, because they do not suffer from the market failures that harm other creators. 
 101. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2018) (“[T]he owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive rights . . . 
to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies . . . .”). 
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C. Using Intellectual Property Law to Exercise Post-Sale Control 
The previous section suggests that visual artists who create 
authentic tangible work rely primarily on their personal property 
ownership interest in the tangible items they create. Their main 
source of income is the sale of those tangible items, such as 
paintings and sculptures—not copyright. Nevertheless, copyright 
subsists in their works.102 What role does it play? 
For relatively few artists, copyright is used to earn income by 
controlling massive commercialization of their works: from 
merchandise that incorporates Andy Warhol’s or Keith Haring’s 
work to posters presenting those of Pablo Picasso or Salvador Dali. 
Such commercialization requires a license to reproduce the work 
from the artists (or their heirs), and it thus generates income. 
Nevertheless, very few artists generate significant revenue from 
mass commercialization, and for most of them this is a relatively 
minor source of income compared to the proceeds from the sale  
of their works.103 
Copyright, however, is sometimes used as a tool of post-sale 
control over the use of artworks. When an artist creates a tangible 
artifact—that is, when the work is fixed—it is typically protected 
by copyright.104 However, when the object is first sold, much of the 
copyright in the work is extinguished. Specifically, the copyright 
owner’s rights to control the distribution of the artifact and its 
public display are exhausted and cannot be exercised.105 In other 
words, once a painting or a sculpture is sold, the owner of the 
artifact is free to transfer it to others and to display it publicly 
without the authorization of the artist.106 
Nevertheless, the exclusive right to reproduce the work is not 
exhausted by the sale of an artifact.107 Presenting the work of art 
that was purchased does not require reproduction, but presenting 
 
 102. Id. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship 
fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”). 
 103. See supra note 86. 
 104. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 105. Id. § 109(a), (c); see also infra Section IV.C (discussing how contemporary  
art challenges the principles of copyright exhaustion and how that affects our  
notion of ownership). 
 106. Rub, supra note 48, at 749–50. 
 107. See Capitol Records, L.L.C. v. ReDigi, Inc., 910 F.3d 649, 657 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. 
denied, 139 S. Ct. 2760 (2019). 
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the work in another medium—such as in a catalog or on a 
museum’s website—involves reproduction and therefore might 
require a license.108 
In addition to the artists’ economic rights under the Copyright 
Act, they are entitled to certain moral rights under the Visual 
Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA).109 Those nontransferable rights 
of attribution and integrity are designed to protect the artist’s 
personal noneconomic interests.110 They thus create an ongoing 
connection between artists and their works. 
The attribution right gives artists a cause of action when their 
names are used in connection with works that either they did not 
create111 or were distorted or mutilated in a way that would harm 
the artists’ honor or reputation.112 The integrity right creates a cause 
of action under certain circumstances when the work is being 
distorted or destroyed.113 Together, those rights raise the possibility 
 
 108. It is not obvious that a license is indeed needed. The purchaser of an artwork and 
any subsequent purchaser can rely on two main theories in arguing that a license is not 
needed. First, the sale of the artifact might be considered to include an implied nonexclusive 
license from the artist to the buyer to reproduce the work in a way that is incidental to the 
ownership of the artifact. See I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 775–76 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(explaining how a copyright owner might be considered to grant an implied license in similar 
circumstances). This argument is not without doubts, partly because of a circular rejoinder: 
the fact that many museums believe that they need a license, and that they spend significant 
resources entering explicit contracts with artists regarding the reproduction of their works, 
might suggest that a license should not be typically implied. 
Second, a museum might claim that creating a copy for a catalog or a website is fair 
use. Determining if a use is fair hinges on a four-factor test, as codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
The first factor, the purpose and character of the use, can cut both ways. On the one hand, 
the use is, at best, only borderline transformative. On the other hand, museums are typically 
nonprofit institutes. The second factor, the nature of the work, and the third, the amount 
used, will probably support the finding of infringement because the works are protected by 
copyright and, in many cases, being copied in their entirety. Finally, the fourth factor, the 
market harm to the copyright holder—which is likely “the single most important” one, 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985)—will likely 
strongly support fair use. The presentation of works on websites or catalogues is no 
substitute for the work and does not harm the artist’s income stream. This is, of course, a 
simplified analysis of the complex question of fair use, but it indicates that museums’ fair 
use claims are strong although not guaranteed to prevail. 
To the best of my knowledge, those issues were never fully litigated. But see Teter v. 
Glass Onion, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (W.D. Mo. 2010) (considering a gallery’s possible 
implied license to present an image of the artist’s works on its website; in that case, however, 
the artist and the gallery had a long-term relationship, including several explicit agreements). 
 109. The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 was codified in 17 U.S.C. § 106A. 
 110. Pollara v. Seymour, 344 F.3d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 111. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(B). 
 112. Id. § 106A(a)(2). 
 113. Id. § 106A(a)(3). 
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that handling works without the artists’ consent might violate  
their moral rights. 
While these cases are not common, artists do, from time to time, 
sue museums, galleries, and collectors to enforce their post-sale 
moral rights when their works are allegedly harmed. For example, 
in 2011, Sotheby’s planned to auction a 1990 print on aluminum by 
Cady Noland, titled Cowboys Milking. Noland was at the time (and 
until recently) the most commercially successful living female artist 
in the world.114 Unfortunately, at some point before the work came 
into Sotheby’s possession, its four corners were slightly bent. Upon 
discovering this, Noland, through her lawyer, contacted Sotheby’s 
and claimed that the work had been distorted in a way that would 
be prejudicial to her honor and reputation.115 Sotheby’s then 
withdrew the work.116 Similarly, in 2007, the Swiss contemporary 
artist Christoph Büchel and the Massachusetts Museum of 
Contemporary Art (MASS MoCA) sued each other. The dispute 
revolved around a massive installment of Büchel’s work, titled 
Training Ground for Democracy. According to the museum, Büchel’s 
requirements concerning the installation were unreasonable, but 
when the museum decided to present parts of the work without the 
artist’s approval, the parties ended up in court.117 Even less well-
known artists sometimes file VARA lawsuits. In 2014, for example, 
Jomar Statkun successfully sued a gallery for cropping one of his 
paintings at the request of a buyer.118 
Those isolated cases might create the wrong impression. This 
type of VARA litigation is relatively rare, and winning is difficult. 
 
 114. Jason Daley, Jenny Saville Takes Title of Most Expensive Living Female Artist, 
SMITHSONIAN MAG.: SMARTNEWS (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-
news/jenny-saville-becomes-most-expensive-living-female-artist-180970497. 
 115. Marc Jancou Fine Art Ltd. v. Sotheby’s, Inc., No. 650316/2012, 2012 WL 7964120  
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 13, 2012). 
 116. The owner of the work later sued Sotheby’s for breach of contract and Noland for 
tortious interference in a contractual relationship. The court dismissed the claim because the 
contract with Sotheby’s allowed it to withdraw the work if “there is doubt as to its 
authenticity” and because of “Noland’s assertion of her right under VARA . . . there was 
more than ‘doubt’ as to attribution.” Id. 
 117. Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Büchel, 593 F.3d 38, 42–46 (1st 
Cir. 2010). The parties settled after the First Circuit allowed part of Büchel’s suit to proceed 
to trial. See Training Ground for Democracy, MASS MOCA (Dec. 7, 2010), https:// 
massmoca.org/event/training-ground-democracy. 
 118. Statkun v. Klemens Gasser & Tanja Grunert, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 5570(LAK), 2014 WL 
1383849 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014). 
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VARA is narrow in scope. It only applies to living artists119 and only 
if their work is protected by copyright.120 Works that are not 
protected by copyright, such as the conceptual artworks that this 
Article focuses on, are therefore automatically excluded from 
VARA protection. Moreover, VARA is designed to protect only fine 
art, and therefore it excludes many works that are protected by 
copyright.121 In addition, the rights it provides are narrow and 
subject to multiple defenses. For example, modifications that are 
the result of “the passage of time” or the result of conservation are 
immune from liability under VARA unless, in the case of 
conservation, it is done in gross negligence.122 On top of the legal 
limitations, the rarity of those formal legal proceedings makes them 
salient, and therefore they can entail significant reputational harm 
for the parties involved.123 
Overall, the combination of the right of reproduction  
under copyright law and the moral rights under VARA allows 
artists to control some limited aspects concerning the post-sale use 
of their works. As further discussed below in section III.B, the social 
norms of the art world grant artists different and mostly broader 
post-sale rights. 
D. Legal (Non)Protection of Conceptual Art 
Part I of this Article explores one of the main innovative 
features of the conceptual art movement: emphasizing ideas that 
 
 119. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(1) (2018). 
 120. Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 302 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 121. VARA protection is limited to only artists who created a “work of visual art.” 
VARA defines that term narrowly in an attempt to cover only fine art. 17 U.S.C. § 101. That 
narrow definition excludes many copyrighted works from VARA protection. This limitation, 
while significant to some creators, such as photographers, is less relevant to the visual artists 
whose interests are at the heart of this Article. For them, as fine artists, if their work is 
protected by copyright (and in many cases it is not), it is likely protected by VARA as well. 
 122. Id. § 106A(c)(1)–(2). 
 123. For example, Cady Noland’s reputation as an artist who aggressively enforces her 
alleged post-sale rights affects the market for her work. When Scott Mueller, a businessman 
and an art collector affiliated with the Cleveland Museum of Art, purchased her work, titled 
Log Cabin, in 2014, he insisted on including a provision in the purchase agreement that would 
allow him to return the work for a full refund of the purchase price ($1.4 million) if Noland 
ever disowns the work. The details of this arrangement became public when Noland did just 
that: disowned the work. See Mueller v. Michael Janssen Gallery Pte. Ltd., 225 F. Supp. 3d 
201, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). Similarly, the clash between Christoph Büchel and MASS MoCA is 
well known in the art world, and some industry insiders I interviewed commented 
negatively on both parties to this dispute. 
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can be simply executed instead of technical artistic craftsmanship, 
and even dematerialization, where artists do not create tangible 
objects at all. Sections A through C of this Part detail how private 
property law and copyright law work in tandem to protect and 
incentivize creativity. This section analyzes the tension between the 
two. It suggests that dematerialized conceptual artworks do not fit 
the legal framework and, as such, they evade legal protection. They 
are, this section maintains, a legal nothingness. 
First, consider the importance that conceptual art attributes to 
ideas and concepts at the expense of their technical expressions. 
Such a shift, which can be traced to the readymade movement,124 
challenges the hidden assumptions upon which our legal 
framework for protecting and incentivizing creativity rely. Take, 
for example, the following description by Sol LeWitt, one of the 
most important conceptual artists of the twentieth century: 
In conceptual art the idea or concept is the most important aspect 
of the work. When an artist uses a conceptual form of art, it means 
that all of the planning and decisions are made beforehand and 
the execution is a perfunctory affair. The idea becomes a machine 
that makes the art. . . . It is usually free from the dependence on 
the skill of the artist as a craftsman.125 
This statement undermines an important hidden assumption  
in copyright law. Like many other artists, including Duchamp  
and Gonzalez-Torres, LeWitt places the entire value of the work in 
its “idea or concept.” But both ideas and concepts are mentioned 
explicitly in the Copyright Act as outside the subject matter  
of protection.126 
Copyright, instead, protects the execution of the ideas and 
concepts. The law’s hidden assumption is that the value of the work 
is found primarily in its execution. But conceptual artists keep the 
execution intentionally simple—“a perfunctory affair” as LeWitt 
put it. However, those who are engaged in this “perfunctory 
affair”—expressing the idea—are those who copyright law 
 
 124. See supra text accompanying notes 59–65. 
 125. LeWitt, supra note 66, at 80 (footnote omitted); see also GODFREY, supra note 53, at 4 
(“Conceptual art is not about forms or materials, but about ideas and meanings.”). 
 126. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection . . . extend to any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
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considers authors.127 Authors are the ones who are granted 
copyright protection, whether or not they used ideas that were 
created and developed by others.128 Moreover, if an artist’s work 
lacks copyright protection, it is also not subject to moral rights,129 
and thus the artist cannot exercise any legal post-sale control over 
the use of her work. 
Nevertheless, as long as the artist produces a tangible object, 
her private property rights in that object and the “aura of 
authenticity” it possesses will compensate the artist for her creative 
labor. Indeed, even if the tangible objects are too simple to be 
protected by copyright, the value of the work can be extracted from 
the unique authentic object created by the artist.130 
 
 127. See infra Section IV.C. 
 128. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (“Copyright in a work . . . vests initially in the author . . . .”).  
The distinction between unprotected ideas and protected expressions is one of the most 
complex notions in copyright law, and a full analysis thereof is beyond the scope of this 
work. It is, however, important to note that although “expression” and “execution” are 
closely related, they are not synonymous. There could be cases in which an artist will come 
up with an idea—as the term is commonly used—but the idea will be detailed enough to be 
considered an expression, as the term is understood in copyright law. In fact, some of  
Sol LeWitt’s works might fit that mold, as they include very detailed instructions regarding 
the execution. If those instructions include the artistic choices that copyright considers 
expressions, which they arguably do, see Peter J. Karol, The Threat of Termination in a 
Dematerialized Art Market, 64 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 187, 188–90 (2017), then LeWitt’s 
instructions are a copyright-protected expression. 
On the other hand, copyright law does not protect a work if it expresses an idea that 
can only be expressed in a few ways. In that case, the idea and the expression are considered 
merged, which makes the work unprotected. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 
1359 (Fed. Cir. 2014). That rule likely applies to many readymade and conceptual artworks. 
Because of their simple execution, there are likely limited ways to express the idea behind 
such works. For example, the execution of a work such as Fountain is so trivial that it might 
not be protected by copyright, and thus free for others to copy. 
 129. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 130. This was true with respect to the “authentic” readymade works, which were sold 
for hefty sums a century ago, and it is still true nowadays when it comes to conceptual artists 
who produce tangible objects. Damien Hirst, for example, one of the richest living artists in 
the world, produces such work. His The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone 
Living—showing a shark in a tank of steel and glass—was sold for about $12 million in 2004. 
Carol Vogel, Swimming with Famous Dead Sharks, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2006), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/arts/design/01voge.html. Another one of his works—
Lullaby Spring—featuring a ten-foot steel cabinet with more than 6,000 pills, was sold for 
$19.2 million in 2007. Pernilla Holmes, The Branding of Damien Hirst, ARTNEWS (Oct. 1, 2007), 
http://www.artnews.com/2007/10/01/the-branding-of-damien-hirst/. Indeed, whether 
or not Hirst’s works are protected by copyright, his ownership rights over the objects he 
creates allow him to make a fortune from his creativity. Carol Vogel, Art Sales Put London in 
Catbird Seat (and New York on Notice), N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2007), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2007/06/25/arts/design/25auct.html. 
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But dematerialized artworks cannot even enjoy that source of 
income. Those artists who create dematerialized art, that is, pure 
ideas, do not produce any tangible item, and so there is no authentic 
object that they own once the work is completed. Without a tangible 
object, there are obviously no private property rights in the work. 
Consider, for example, Felix Gonzales-Torres’s “Untitled” 
(Portrait of Ross in L.A.), discussed above. It seems to escape all 
forms of legal protection.131 The work is not protected by copyright, 
because the idea of having 175 pounds of colorful candies on the 
floor is exactly that—an idea—and ideas are not protected by 
copyright. The elements that can, maybe, be protected by 
copyright—the creative choices concerning the expression of the 
idea—are not only trivial but were not made by Gonzalez-Torres. 
The exact choice of colors, the shape of the arrangement, and its size 
are not dictated by Gonzalez-Torres’s instructions and are left to 
the individual, typically a curator, who is setting up the exhibit. For 
example, below are several installations of the same work—
“Untitled” (Portrait of Ross in L.A.).132 
 
 131. This Article focuses on the two main legal rights that artists have: personal 
property rights in the artifacts they create and copyright. It explains that conceptual artists 
that create dematerialized works cannot rely on any of those rights. One can consider other 
legal claims that conceptual artists might assert if a museum presents the artists’ works, such 
as those that are based on trademark, unfair competition, fraud, right of publicity, unjust 
enrichment, and more. It is doubtful that any of those theories can prevent a museum from 
presenting an unauthorized dematerialized art, such as “Untitled” (Portrait of Ross in L.A.). 
For example, suing a museum for such use under the Lanham Act would be quite 
challenging. Conceptual art does not fit well within the definition of a mark under the Act, 
as this is not how we typically think of trademarks (which identify goods), service marks 
(which identify services), collective marks (which certify a certain origin or quality), or 
collective marks (which indicate membership in an organization). 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018). 
Moreover, the Supreme Court read the relevant provisions of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(a), narrowly, and explicitly rejected the argument that when it comes to a 
communicative product, such as a book or novel, trademark law protects the origin of the 
work itself and not just the origin of the physical object in which the work is fixed. Dastar 
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003). The Court stressed that 
such a protection can be achieved only through the Copyright Act and “once 
the . . . copyright monopoly has expired, the public may use the . . . work at will and without 
attribution[,]” id. at 33–34, and that Congress chose to regulate the right of attribution with 
the enactment of VARA and not by the Lanham Act, id. at 34–35. A full analysis of artists’ 
rights under the Lanham Act and other causes of action is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 132. As a practical matter, whether or not the curators’ contribution meets the legal 
requirement for copyrightability, curators and museums do not seek protection for the 
arrangement of conceptual artworks. Those who I spoke with found this notion strange and 
even offensive. See also infra Section IV.B. 
001.RUB_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/5/20  9:52 PM 




Copyright law focuses on the expression of ideas and on the 
elements that together constitute that expression—such as shapes, 
colors, and arrangements.133 Infringement analysis of three-
dimensional works, for example, considers whether the works are 
substantially similar—that is, whether their protected elements 
look alike. Specifically, the judge or jury examines the expressive 
elements of the works in question and not the ideas behind them.134 
Therefore, the copyright-protected elements in this work, if there 
are any, do not belong to Gonzalez-Torres, but to the individual, 
the curator, who made those artistic choices. Moreover, as the 
pictures above demonstrate, various installations of “Untitled” 
(Portrait of Ross in L.A.) may look different. Therefore, and although 
the art world treats them as the same work, they are, as far as 
copyright law is concerned, different works: a rectangle of candies, 
a pyramid of candies, and a circle of candies. 
Indeed, by defining the work by its ideas, and by treating the 
expressive elements as nothing more than “a perfunctory affair” 
 
 133. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 134. Kaminski & Rub, supra note 42, at 1119–20 (exploring how copyright law applies 
the various substantial similarity tests). 
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that is left for the curator to execute, Gonzalez-Torres’s creativity is 
made unsuitable for copyright protection.135 
Gonzalez-Torres also cannot rely on personal property law, 
because he did not create the tangible objects that are being 
presented. While Duchamp purchased the urinal and the pedestal 
and physically created Fountain, Gonzalez-Torres did not do 
anything similar. He did not create any object. Even if he created 
the first installment of the work, that installment—those 175 
pounds of candies—is long gone. It was eradicated the first time the 
work was presented and visitors took those candies from it. If no 
tangible object that was created by the artist survived the first 
installation of the work, then no object can be subject to personal 
property rights. 
This is the legal nothingness. Putting aside patent law, which is 
irrelevant in this case,136 public ideas simply cannot be subject to 
legal protection. The law does not recognize any property right 
with respect to those ideas.137 As such, from a legal perspective, 
they cannot be owned, sold, or bought. 
If no form of legal mechanism protects Gonzalez-Torres’s work, 
then how can society incentivize the creation of those pure ideas 
that form dematerialized art? More specifically, how can Gonzalez-
 
 135. There are other legal obstacles to copyright protection for some works by 
conceptual artists. For example, the tendency of conceptual artists to use unorthodox 
materials might challenge copyright law’s notion of fixation. If, for example, the artist uses 
materials that change over time, such as flowers, one might argue that this ever-changing 
work is not fixed, and therefore it is not subject to copyright protection. See Kelley v. Chi. 
Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 292 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that the “Wildflower Works” by the 
famous artist Chapman Kelley is not protected by copyright because a living garden does 
not meet the fixation requirement); cf. Zahr K. Said, Copyright’s Illogical Exclusion of Conceptual 
Art, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 335 (2016) (arguing that conceptual artworks, including Kelley’s 
work, satisfy the fixation requirement). For the arguments set forth by Professor Said, I find 
the Kelley court’s reasoning unconvincing. However, the issue discussed in this section in 
connection to Gonzalez-Torres’s works has nothing to do with the fixation requirement.  
See Said, supra, at 354 (“There may be many sound reasons to exclude conceptual art from 
copyright protection, perhaps chief among them that, often, conceptual art is driven by a 
concept, or idea, which copyright law remains committed to excluding.”). 
 136. While patent law can protect more abstract ideas, those are protected only if they 
meet the requirement of patentability, and in particular if they are useful, novel, and 
nonobvious. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2018). This is part of the law’s overall balance that reserves 
the strongest form of protection—which extends to ideas—to the newest and most path-
breaking works. In this case, it is quite obvious that Gonzalez-Torres’s works cannot be 
protected by patents, as they are not useful and probably cannot meet any of the other 
requirements for patentability. 
 137. See also infra Section IV.A.  
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Torres, and artists like him, earn a living? The answer lies primarily 
in the social norms of the art world. Those norms and their effects 
are the subject matter of the next Part of this Article. 
III. FROM NOTHING TO SOMETHING:  
THE SOCIAL NORMS OF THE ART WORLD 
The previous Part explained how conceptual art challenges the 
legal framework for protecting and incentivizing creativity. 
Conceptual artists create powerful works that consist of pure ideas. 
Those works are not protected by either personal property rights or 
copyright. Therefore, as far as the law is concerned, those works 
cannot be subject to any type of property rights: they are nothing. 
Moreover, many of those works are intentionally simple, and 
therefore copying them would be very quick and easy. Indeed, no 
legal norm prevents a museum from buying 175 pounds of 
individually wrapped candies in multicolor cellophane and 
presenting them as a work of art. Considering that such a work will 
be visually identical to any other Felix Gonzalez-Torres 
installations, why should museums not do so? In other words, what 
rights do creators of dematerialized artworks have? 
While the law does not arm conceptual artists with legal rights, 
the social norms in the art industry step in and fill this gap.138  
 
 138. To explore those social norms and the rights they create, I reviewed dozens of 
published interviews with industry insiders and studied industry publications and websites. 
In addition, I conducted my own interviews. I interviewed thirteen industry insiders, 
including curators, museums’ and galleries’ senior administrators, and collection managers. 
When allowed, I also reviewed legal documents, such as contracts their institutions entered 
into. My interviewees were affiliated with ten different institutes, including private 
collections; large public galleries; and small, medium, and large museums, including one of 
the twenty largest museums in the world (measured, as is the industry practice, by the size 
of the gallery space). Four of the institutes are located in New York, three in Ohio, and three 
in Israel. The relevant Israeli law is substantially similar to American law. Specifically, they 
both do not protect public ideas. I used my personal connections to secure some of those 
interviews. In addition, I asked each of my interviewees to recommend and connect me with 
others I should speak to, which proved to be the most fruitful way to secure interviews. 
Many of my interviewees also recommended other written materials that would assist me in 
this study. Three of the interviews were held over the phone and the rest in person. All the 
in-person interviews were held, at my interviewees’ request, at the art institute with which 
they were affiliated. To encourage open and informal conversation, I did not record any of 
my interviews but took detailed notes during the conversations and immediately thereafter. 
The shortest interview lasted twenty-five minutes and the longest more than two and a half 
hours. On average, each interview lasted about an hour and a half. To encourage my 
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In fact, a close examination of those social norms, which this Part 
provides, shows that the social norms create a scheme that, in many 
respects, resembles the core framework of the legal protection of 
creativity. Indeed, while the legal system grants Picasso both 
private property rights and copyright in his paintings, the social 
norms of the art world arm him with somewhat parallel rights. 
The social norms of the art world grant an ownership interest 
to artists in their creations, whether or not that ownership interest 
is legally recognized. The social norms bestow ownership-like 
interest over legal nothingness. This Article calls that interest pseudo 
personal property rights. Like legally recognized private property 
rights, pseudo rights can be bought and sold. Selling their pseudo 
ownership interest provides artists with a valuable source of 
income. Section A discusses those norms. 
On top of pseudo personal property rights, artists also enjoy 
broadly recognized and partly nontransferable rights to control 
certain aspects regarding the work after it is sold. Those rights 
include a right to be consulted and affect the use of their work, as 
well as a related right to determine the authenticity of work that is 
allegedly theirs. Indeed, the art world recognizes an ongoing 
connection between the work and the artist who created it. That 
connection is sometimes parallel to copyright law, but, as this Part 
explains, the contours of the social norms are different and typically 
broader than the legal norms. Those social norms, which apply 
even when the law does not provide the artists any post-sale rights, 
are explored in section B below. 
Section C discusses other aspects of the social norms of the art 
world. It focuses on the degree of flexibility that those norms entail, 
as well as their varying impacts in different contexts. 
A. Pseudo Property Rights over Legal Nothingness 
Paintings, like any other tangible artifacts, typically have 
owners. They can be bought, sold, gifted, or loaned. Intangible 
rights in paintings—that is, copyright—can also be owned and 
subject to their own set of standard transactions: buying, selling, 
 
interviewees to be candid, I promised them (as well as The Ohio State University’s Office of 
Responsible Research Practices, which approved this study) to not identify any of them by 
their name or by the name of their affiliated institute. 
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gifting, licensing, and more. As a legal matter, public ideas139—for 
example, dematerialized artworks—are not subject to property 
rights, and therefore transactions in those ideas are meaningless. 
The art world, however, considers the artists of all works of art, 
including works that consist of pure ideas, to initially have 
property-like rights in their works. 
Take, for example, Felix Gonzalez-Torres’s work, discussed  
in section I.C., “Untitled” (Portrait of Ross in L.A.). Multiple leading 
fine art websites and publications state that the work is located at 
the Art Institute of Chicago.140 The website of the Art Institute  
of Chicago states that the work is a “[p]romised gift of Donna and 
Howard Stone.”141 The Smithsonian’s website suggests that the 
work is “on extended loan from Donna and Howard Stone.”142 The 
Chicago Tribune’s art section similarly suggested that the work “has 
been on loan to the Art Institute for the last few years.”143  
In November 2015, ArtNews reported that another candy-based 
work of Felix Gonzalez-Torres, titled “Untitled” (L.A.), was “sold 
last week at Christie’s postwar and contemporary evening  
sale for $7,669,000.”144 
Those descriptions raise multiple questions: What does it mean 
that this type of work—in essence, an idea—is located somewhere? 
What exactly is located there? What does it mean to gift or to loan 
it? A loan typically includes a temporary transfer of possession,  
 
 139. Private ideas can likely be subject to property rights under the law of ideas. See 
infra notes 224–29 and accompanying text. However, the law of ideas is inapplicable to public 
ideas, such as those whose implementations are presented at the MoMA. See infra notes  
229–30 and accompanying text. 
 140. See, e.g., Hide/Seek: “Untitled” (Portrait of Ross in L.A.) by Felix Gonzalez-Torres,  
NAT’L PORTRAIT GALLERY, https://www.si.edu/es/object/yt_37bSb-aQ4BM?width=85% 
25&height=85%25&iframe=true&destination=spotlight/frederick-johnson-photographs 
(last visited Feb. 19, 2020); “Untitled” (Portrait of Ross in L.A.), WIKIART (Oct. 9, 2012), 
https://www.wikiart.org/en/felix-gonzalez-torres/untitled-portrait-of-ross-in-l-a-1991. 
 141. Description of “Untitled” (Portrait of Ross in L.A.), ART INST. CHI. (emphasis added), 
http://www.artic.edu/aic/collections/artwork/152961 (last visited Feb. 19, 2020). 
 142. Hide/Seek: Portraits by Felix Gonzalez-Torres and David Wojnarowicz, NAT’L PORTRAIT 
GALLERY (emphasis added), https://www.si.edu/es/object/yt_4iiLMJru7SY (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2020). 
 143. Lisa Stein, What a Concept, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 22, 2000) (emphasis added), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2000-10-22/news/0010220318_1_art-institute-
conceptual-art-new-museum. 
 144. Hannah Ghorashi, Crystal Bridges Museum Acquires Record-Setting Work by Felix 
Gonzalez-Torres, ARTNEWS (Nov. 16, 2015, 5:01 PM) (emphasis added), https://www. 
artnews.com/art-news/market/crystal-bridges-museum-acquires-record-setting-work-by-
felix-gonzalez-torres-5359/. 
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but here there is none. So what is being loaned? And what did the 
buyer of the work get in return for almost $8 million? As far as the 
law is concerned, the answer to all those questions is nothing.  
Those descriptions are meaningless. Indeed, only by treating the 
pure idea as the equivalent of an object could those statements start  
to make sense. 
This materialization of pure ideas does not stop here. Museums 
commonly enter loan agreements concerning those works. One 
such agreement that I was allowed to review during my study, 
concerning a dematerialized Felix Gonzalez-Torres work, is titled 
“Borrower’s Agreement.” In it, the “owner” of the work states that 
it “will be pleased to lend” the work to a museum for a specific 
period of time. The same document, nevertheless, mentions that 
“there is no object to lend in this case.” 
The social norms of the art world go well beyond the mere 
symbolism of property rights.145 The art world actually treats those 
intangible dematerialized works as physical artifacts. Most notably, 
the art world treats them as rivalrous goods, and it thus creates 
artificial scarcity, uniqueness, and value. The next paragraphs 
explain those impacts in greater detail. 
Most tangible goods, from cars and chairs to paintings and 
manuscripts, are rivalrous, in the sense that their consumption by 
one prevents or limits the consumption by another.146 Intangible 
goods, like ideas, are an example of non-rivalrous goods, where the 
consumption by one person does not limit consumption by 
another.147 Without the art world’s social norms, “Untitled” (Portrait 
of Ross in L.A.) would have been non-rivalrous. Everyone, including 
every museum, could have presented and enjoyed the work 
simultaneously: buy 175 pounds of colorful candy and present it 
according to the well-known simple directions that were originally 
set forth by Felix Gonzalez-Torres. 
But doing so would be inconsistent with the social norms of this 
industry. According to those norms, there is only one “Untitled” 
 
 145. See also infra text accompanying note 162. 
 146. Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons 
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 945–46 (2005). 
 147. Id. 
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(Portrait of Ross in L.A.).148 The work is “owned” by Donna and 
Howard Stone and “kept,” on a long-term “loan,” by the Art 
Institute of Chicago.149 That work was “purchased” from Felix 
Gonzalez-Torres and was “transferred” from one owner to another 
until it was “purchased” by the current owners in 1997.150 Those 
owners, like the owners of tangible items, can “loan” the work to 
others. In the case of “Untitled” (Portrait of Ross in L.A.), the 
“owners” did just that.151 The truly crucial aspect of this norm is 
 
 148. Not every dematerialized work exists in just one copy. When the artist creates a 
work, she can decide how many copies of it may exist at any given time. Thus, an artist may 
decide that at any given time there will be five copies of the work, which, as far as the art 
world is concerned, means that the artist created and can sell five works. See, e.g., Taylor, 
supra note 5 (explaining how a conceptual work titled Comedian was sold to three separate 
buyers). Purchasers are, of course, informed before buying whether the work is unique and, 
if not, how many copies of it will exist at any given time. Some of them require the artist to 
contractually promise not to sell more instances of the work. Unique works, however, are 
typically significantly more expensive. This practice does not undermine the core 
observation and argument made in this section: every authorized copy of a work, even a 
pure idea, must originally be purchased from the artist who came up with that idea. 
 149. Description of “Untitled” (Portrait of Ross in L.A.), supra note 141. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. It should be noted that there is one tangible item that the purchasers of a 
dematerialized work sometimes get: a certificate of authorship. That document is sometimes 
signed by the artist and includes the instructions for installing the work. Some artists even 
require the purchasers of their works (i.e., the purchasers of the pseudo personal property 
rights) to sign the certificate, allegedly creating a contract. Joan Kee, Félix González-Torres on 
Contracts, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 517, 519 (2017). 
However, the importance of the physical certificate itself should not be overstated. 
Suggesting that the certificate is the work that museums are paying millions for seems 
unreasonable. Cf. Martha Buskirk, Public Experience/Private Authority, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 469, 475 (2017) (discussing a lawsuit, which quickly settled, by a collector against a 
gallery that lost a certificate of authenticity). First, from a legal perspective, those certificates 
have limited value. Their main source of power is rooted in the social norms of the industry 
and not with legal limitations on the use of the work. Even if some of those certificates are 
contracts, which is not without doubts, they are obviously not easements and they do not 
create property rights that legally bind downstream buyers and third parties (e.g., other 
museums). In other words, as a purely legal matter, no certificate can prevent a museum, or 
anyone else who did not sign the certificate, from presenting a candy-based work of  
Felix González-Torres. Cf. Peter J. Karol, Permissive Certificates: Collectors of Art as Collectors of 
Permissions, 94 WASH. L. REV. 1175 (2019) (considering the legal impact of certain certificates 
of authenticity). 
Second, my impression from discussing the matter with industry insiders is that the 
certificates themselves have limited power even as far as the social norms are concerned. 
Dematerialized works are being “loaned” routinely without any change in the possession of 
their certificates. Borrowing agreements that I reviewed included the instructions for the 
installation but not the certificates. Most of my interviewees, including those who routinely 
engaged in loaning and borrowing conceptual art, never saw a certificate. Some told me that 
even when they buy art it is mostly unaccompanied by a certificate. Others told me that their 
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that my interviewees stressed time and again that a museum would 
never present an installation of the work without receiving 
permission from the pseudo-owner. That permission is typically in 
the form of a “borrowing” agreement. Because this right of the 
artists and their purchasers is respected by the entire art world, it is 
de facto a right against the world—a pseudo property right. 
This last point is worth stressing because it is the heart of this 
entire ecosystem. In my conversations with industry insiders, some 
of whom work for large museums and some for smaller institutes, 
I repeatedly asked if they would ever consider presenting one of 
Felix Gonzalez-Torres’s dematerialized works “on their own” 
without contacting the “owner.” Most of my interviewees could 
barely understand the question. I explained that they could easily 
purchase 175 pounds of candies and present it in exactly the way 
that Gonzales-Torres intended. With no exception, all my 
interviewees told me, in one way or another, that what I was asking 
them to consider was “to create and present a forgery, which we 
would never do.” Some interviewees called such actions 
“piracy.”152 Most of them could not imagine that any museum or 
gallery would ever deviate from this norm. Some of them said that 
if any institute presents “unauthorized” work, the reputational 
harm will be immense, and nobody will take that institute seriously 
or want to transact with it. 
Because museums and galleries refuse to present “Untitled” 
(Portrait of Ross in L.A.) unless it is “on loan” from the work’s 
 
certificate certifies that their installation of a work is consistent with the artist’s vision, which 
means that the certificate is not transferable. 
I asked my interviewees what would happen if an original certificate were lost. They 
noted that if that happens, which is unlikely, it would not hurt the “authenticity” of the work. 
In other words, if the Crystal Bridges Museum loses the certificate of authenticity concerning 
“Untitled” (L.A.), a work that cost it almost $8 million, the art world would still perceive the 
museum as the owner of the work. 
It should be noted, however, that most of my interviewees work in museums, and 
museums, with minor and rare exceptions, do not sell their art. Therefore, one cannot rule 
out that a different population, one that engaged more routinely in selling and buying 
artworks (as opposed to loaning and presenting them) would place greater weight on 
certificates of authenticity. 
 152. One of my interviewees, however, stated that he does not consider it piracy or 
morally problematic. But when I asked him if his institute would ever consider presenting 
such a work without a borrowing agreement, he noted they would not because the 
reputational backlash would be severe, especially from the institute who “owns” the  
work. He explained that “that institute, and others, will not work with us in the future if  
we do that.” 
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pseudo-owner, there is at most only one copy of the work presented 
at any given time. Artificial scarcity is thus the natural result of this 
social norm. 
That artificial scarcity gives the artist a powerful and valuable 
property-like right. Because the artist is the initial pseudo-owner of 
the work, she can sell that right (i.e., the work). As the buyer knows 
that after the sale she will be the only one who is considered 
authorized to present the work, she is willing to pay for her 
exclusive rights.153 This reality puts all visual artists, whether they 
create tangible artifacts or pure ideas, on equal footing. 
B. Post-Sale Artistic Control 
Part II explains that our legal system protects creativity  
through both private property law and copyright law. But visual 
artists who create unique, authentic, tangible works typically do 
not rely on copyright licensing as their main source of income. 
Instead, those artists primarily use copyright’s right of 
reproduction together with VARA’s moral rights as a way to 
control the post-sale use of their works.154 That control is, however, 
quite narrow in scope, as it is subject to multiple defenses and 
limiting principles.155 Artists who create pure ideas (i.e., 
dematerialized works) do not get copyright or moral rights in their 
creations—which are legal nothingness—and therefore cannot 
exercise any legal post-sale control. 
The social norms of the art world, however, designate a central 
place for artists when it comes to decisions concerning the post-sale 
use of their works. This section explores those social norms. 
 
 153. Sonia Katyal recently compared Gonzalez-Torres works to public goods. Because 
of their “endless nature” and because viewers are invited to take pieces of the works, they 
resemble non-rivalrous goods. Sonia K. Katyal, The Public Good in Poetic Justice, 26 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 497, 500–01 (2017). This is an interesting observation, although it does not 
consider the social norms of the art world. Those norms transform the works into rivalrous 
private goods. Gonzalez-Torres and his Foundation were well aware, see, e.g., infra text 
accompanying note 156, of those norms and enjoyed the financial benefits that are the result 
of the artificially created scarcity. 
 154. See supra Section II.C. 
 155. See supra text accompanying notes 108, 119–22. 
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1. The legal post-sale control rhetoric 
While the law does not allow artists who create dematerialized 
art to control the art’s post-sale use, the art world uses legal 
terminology, often inaccurately, to signal the artists’ ongoing rights 
over certain aspects of their work. 
Consider, for example, Felix Gonzalez-Torres’s candy-based 
works. The Felix Gonzalez-Torres Foundation’s website, which 
until recently included references to dozens of dematerialized 
works, stated that it “holds the copyright in and to all works by 
Gonzalez-Torres.”156 Although many of those works are actually 
not protected by copyright, the art world accepts the Foundation’s 
copyright-like interest in those works. 
Industry websites routinely include a form of copyright notice 
when referring to or presenting Gonzalez-Torres’s candy works. 
On its webpage dedicated to “Untitled” (Portrait of Ross in L.A.),  
the Art Institute of Chicago states “© The Felix Gonzalez-Torres 
Foundation.”157 The Guggenheim Museum has an identical 
copyright notice on its webpage dedicated to another candy-based 
work of Gonzalez-Torres, which the museum recently had on 
display.158 The Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) in New York 
includes a similar notice on its webpage dedicated to another 
Gonzalez-Torres candy-based work: “© 2020 The Felix Gonzalez-
Torres Foundation.”159 
From a legal perspective, those copyright notices are quite 
preposterous. First and foremost, as discussed above, the “work” 
in all those instances is an idea that is not protected by copyright.160 
Second, the notice itself only looks like a copyright notice, but it 
does not meet the legal requirement of such notices. A copyright 
notice must include, alongside the symbol ©, the “year of first 
publication” and the name of the copyright owner.161 The notices 
 
 156. Copyright, FELIX GONZALEZ-TORRES FOUND., http://felixgonzalez-
torresfoundation.org/?page_id=56 (last visited Oct. 24, 2018) (at the time of editing of this 
Article, the foundation’s website is under construction and unavailable). 
 157. Description of “Untitled” (Portrait of Ross in L.A.), supra note 141. 
 158. Description of “Untitled” (Public Opinion), GUGGENHEIM, https://www. 
guggenheim.org/artwork/1512 (last visited Apr. 28, 2020). 
 159. Description of “Untitled” (USA Today), MOMA, https://www.moma.org/ 
collection/works/81073 (last visited Apr. 28, 2020). 
 160. See supra text accompanying notes 131–34. 
 161. 17 U.S.C. § 401(b)  (2018). 
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on the websites of the Art Institute of Chicago and the Guggenheim 
Museum do not include a year of publication, while the one on 
MoMA’s website lists the year 2020, which is obviously not the year 
of first publication. It is surprisingly easy to find similar mistakes 
in other museum websites and printed publications. Luckily, even 
if those works were protected by copyright—and they are not—
since 1988, a copyright notice is no longer a requirement for 
copyright protection.162 
The repeated use of legal terminology is peculiar, and it is 
unclear whether this is just an error, an assumption—unverified 
and mistaken—that the law must follow the industry practice, or 
an attempt to inject legal symbolism into a non-legal system of 
norms. In my interviews with industry insiders, I tried to explore 
whether they know that there is a gap between copyright law and 
their use of copyright terminology and copyright notices. The 
answers were often unsatisfactory and vague. Some of my 
interviewees clearly did not know about the gap and for them it 
was a mistake, others (including some with significant experience 
in copyright law) said that they “didn’t think about it before,” and 
others noted that for them the exact nature of copyright legal norms 
is not crucial or that using the copyright terminology “is something 
that the [artist] wanted us to do.” 
The common thread in the answers I received is that my 
interviewees did not question the copyright-like terminology that 
they were used to applying. As such, it seems that for the art world 
as a whole, the legal cover might help strengthen and support the 
social norms. With those terms, the art world signals that it 
acknowledges a long-lasting link between visual artists, and even 
their estates and foundations, and the works they created. The 
remainder of this section explores the nature of that link and the 
rights that artists—conceptual and non-conceptual—have over 
their sold works. 
2. The norm of consultation 
It is a common practice for museums and galleries to contact 
artists or their estates and foundations to get their views and 
 
 162. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7, 102 Stat. 
2853, 2857 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (2018)). 
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eventually their permission for an exhibition. That permission 
process typically includes conversations about the nature and 
format of the exhibit, how the artists and their work are going to  
be presented, and the supporting materials that are going to be 
produced in connection therewith, such as the exhibit’s catalog  
and webpage. 
The main motivation for this practice, besides the (relatively 
small) litigation risk,163 is artistic. The industry insiders I 
interviewed expressed a desire to “do the best by the artist and the 
work” by preserving the intentions of the artist. Many museums 
have established clear policies to foster a form of dialogue between 
their curators and other administrators and artists. The Museum of 
Contemporary Art in Chicago, for example, sends all artists whose 
work it considers exhibiting a questionnaire that documents their 
desires regarding the way to present their works.164 Other 
museums collect that information when they purchase a work, and 
sometimes they also request that the artist consent in advance to 
future use that is consistent with such information. 
Museums and galleries are especially interested in having the 
artists’ views when they need to exercise greater discretion. 
Curators I spoke with were willing to openly discuss their 
discretion as to what exhibits to have and what works to include 
therein, but they often minimized their role in choosing how a 
specific work is presented. To them, their role in executing the work 
was insignificant and likely meaningless. 
Exhibiting installations of dematerialized art requires greater 
discretion, and it is therefore not surprising that curators are 
typically interested in the artists’ views when it comes to those 
works. Stephanie Skestos, a curator at the Art Institute of Chicago, 
noted that “[w]henever the Art Institute installs any kind of art, we 
want it to be installed the way the artist intended . . . . With 
conceptual pieces sometimes it’s hard to nail that down.”165 
Felix Gonzalez-Torres’s works are especially challenging for 
curators. The instructions for many of his works are intentionally 
 
 163. See supra Section II.C. 
 164. Stein, supra note 143. 
 165. Id. Interestingly, there is clear tension between the curators’ fascination with 
artistic intent and conceptual artists’ desire not to explain their works and let others, 
including curators and viewers, interpret it. See supra note 80. 
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vague.166 Gonzalez-Torres thus invites the curators of his exhibits 
to exercise discretion when installing them. But curators, for the 
most part, would rather not make those judgment calls. Elena 
Filipovic, who curated several exhibitions of Gonzalez-Torres’s 
works, described the need to make those decisions as no less than 
“devastating.”167 Andrea Rosen, Felix Gonzalez-Torres’s former 
gallerist, the executor of his will, and the president of his 
Foundation, commented on that phenomenon from the other 
perspective: that of the artist or, in this case, his Foundation. She 
noted that while the Foundation records how Felix Gonzalez-
Torres’s works are presented by museums and galleries, it does not 
maintain a “record[] of what the rules are, even though institutions 
would like us to do this.”168 
In some cases, the artist or his estate requires the presenting 
museum to take actions that are more than mere consultation. For 
example, some of Sol LeWitt’s works include instructions as to how 
to execute a drawing. But my interviewees explained that, unlike 
Felix Gonzalez-Torres, LeWitt in his lifetime and, after his death, 
his estate, require that those instructions be executed by someone 
from a narrow list of “qualified” painters—most of whom worked 
with LeWitt in his lifetime. This requirement is backed up by all the 
social norms this Article discusses: The pseudo-owner of the work 
will refuse to loan it to a museum unless it follows those 
instructions. Not following them might make the installment 
considered inauthentic or “forged” by the art world. 
Another common situation in which industry insiders feel that 
it is important to consult the artist is when the work needs to be 
conserved.169 Conservation and restoration typically entail 
discretion, and the art world perceives it as vital that the artist’s 
intent is not replaced or even undermined by those who restore the 
work. As Samantha Sheesley explained: “A work of art is fully 
realized and completed when encountered by and interpreted by a 
 
 166. See  FILIPOVIC ET AL., supra note 73, at 12. 
 167. See  id. at 19. 
 168. Interview: Andrea Rosen & Tino Sehgal, in  FILOPOVIC ET AL., supra note 73, at 395; see 
also Kee, supra note 151, at 518 (commenting on the desire of institutions to receive significant 
guidelines when installing Felix Gonzalez-Torres works); Katyal, supra note 153, at 505 
(describing how Gonzalez-Torres insisted on not providing detailed installation instructions 
even when museums asked him to do so). 
 169. See supra Section II.C. 
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viewer. . . . When the interpreter of an artwork is a conservator, 
false impressions can lead to misguided practice.”170 Museums, 
therefore, spend significant resources trying to guarantee that the 
artist’s intent is preserved, which, in the case of a living or recently 
deceased artist, includes consulting with the artist or their 
foundation or estate. One museum insider told me that her institute 
would not conserve any work of a living artist without the artist’s 
explicit consent. In one case, after a work was mutilated by a visitor, 
the museum contacted the artist, who stated that he would rather 
the work be left mutilated—a request that the museum honored.171 
Museums and galleries nowadays take the consultation norm a 
step further, in that they carefully document the artist’s intent 
regardless of their current use of the work. They conduct detailed 
interviews with the artist, sometimes as early as they purchase the 
work, and inquire how exactly the work is to be preserved and 
presented in the future. Those interviews are typically recorded to 
make sure that the artists’ accounts are as accurate as possible.172 
The art world values consulting with artists because it is 
broadly believed that artists are in the best position to present and 
maintain the intent behind a work, and that this intent is what the 
exhibit-goers should be exposed to. Museums and galleries are 
happy to spend the resources involved in this process partly 
because they know that others in the art world are spending those 
resources as well. In that way, this norm preserves the quality of 
artistic works for generations to come. Artists and their foundations 
are regarded as the stewards of authenticity. Indeed, the norm of 
consultation and the norm of authentication, discussed 
immediately below, are tightly connected. In some respects, they 
are two sides of the same coin. 
 
 170. Samantha Sheesley, Artist Interviews as Tools for Diligent Conservation Practice,  
17 TEXTILE SPECIALTY GROUP POSTPRINTS 107, 107 (2007). 
 171. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2) (2018) (“[M]odification of a work of visual art which is 
the result of conservation . . . is not [actionable] unless the modification is caused by gross 
negligence.”); see also infra text accompanying note 181. 
 172. Glenn Wharton, INCCA: A Model for Conserving Contemporary Art, GETTY 
CONSERVATION INST., http://www.getty.edu/conservation/publications_resources/newsletters/ 
24_2/incca.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2020). 
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3. The norm of authentication 
The second post-sale right that the social norms in the art world 
give visual artists is the right to significantly affect which works are 
considered authentic and which are not.173 As discussed in section 
I.B, authenticity is a central concept in the art world. There is a 
broad consensus that collectors, museums, and galleries should 
refrain from purchasing or presenting any work that is not 
authentic. The artist’s position has a tremendous effect on the 
perception of a work as authentic or not and, therefore, on its value. 
Artists can obviously declare that a work is simply a forgery: a 
work—a tangible artifact—that seems to be theirs but was actually 
created by someone else. Experienced industry insiders often 
contact artists, or their foundations and estates, requesting that the 
authenticity of a work be confirmed or refuted. Many foundations 
form “authentication boards” to conduct this very task.174 In 2012, 
for example, Leslie Hindman Auctioneers, a leading auction house 
based in Chicago, contacted the famous contemporary painter 
Peter Doig to verify that a work it was about to auction was indeed 
his. Doig, through his attorney, denied that it was his painting, and 
the auction house refused to auction it.175 The painting immediately 
lost practically all of its value—$7 million by one estimate.176 
The ability of artists to disown their works is broader than 
either the right to announce that a work is forged or the legal right 
of attribution under VARA. Artists, for example, sometimes 
disown their works because they were allegedly distorted or 
modified to their dissatisfaction. Those modifications are typically 
the result of a failure to maintain the condition of the work or a 
failed attempt—at least failed from the artist’s perspective—to 
conserve the work. 
 
 173. This right can also be called a right of attribution, as artists get the power to decide 
which works can be attributed to them and which cannot. I chose to call it a right of 
authentication to not confuse it with the right of attribution under VARA. Supra text 
accompanying note 111. As further explained below, those two rights are related but  
not identical. 
 174. Fincham, supra note 32, at 594. The role of those boards is complex and, in some 
extreme cases, they can even create a liability risk for the foundation. Id. at 604–08. A full 
analysis of the work of those boards is beyond the scope of this work. 
 175. Fletcher v. Doig, 125 F. Supp. 3d 697, 704–05 (N.D. Ill. 2014). 
 176. Andrea Rush, Fletcher v. Doig: A Case of Refuted Authorship and a Role for Alternative 
Dispute Resolution, WIPO MAG. (Feb. 2017), http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/ 
2017/01/article_0007.html. 
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In recent years, the renowned conceptual artist Cady Noland 
disowned two of her works because of their conditions. As 
mentioned above, in 2011 she disowned her print on aluminum 
titled Cowboys Milking, because its corners were slightly bent.177 In 
2014, she disowned her work Log Cabin, because the gallery that 
owned the work replaced some of the wooden logs that formed the 
piece with identical logs once the old logs started to rot.178 In both 
cases, while Noland took legal actions, she did not need to sue to 
disown the work and materially affect its value. Disowning 
Cowboys Milking only required her to notify Sotheby’s, and the latter 
refused to auction it.179 Disowning Log Cabin required only a public 
announcement, which caused the buyer of the work to cancel the 
transaction and return the item to the seller. 
It is quite doubtful that Noland had legal recourse in any of 
those cases. VARA exempts damage “which is a result of the 
passage of time or the inherent nature of the materials.”180 It is quite 
likely that the damage to Cowboys Milking was caused by “the 
passage of time” as well as the nature of the aluminum, a soft metal, 
that Noland used to create it, which means that there would not be 
any liability for this damage. VARA also exempts damage that is 
the result of conservation, unless it was caused by gross 
negligence.181 This likely means that the owner of Log Cabin did not 
infringe on Noland’s moral rights.182 
Indeed, VARA plays a limited role in this ecosystem.183 
Regardless of her legal rights, the mere fact that Noland does not 
perceive those works as hers anymore is enough for much of the art 
 
 177. See supra text accompanying note 115. 
 178. See supra note 123. 
 179. Noland contacted Sotheby’s through her lawyer, see supra text accompanying note 
116. However, as discussed below, infra text accompanying notes 180–82, Sotheby’s 
acceptance of Noland’s demands was likely not rooted only in her legal rights. 
 180. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(1) (2018). 
 181. Id. § 106A(c)(2). 
 182. This question might be litigated as part of the complaint that Noland filed against 
the gallery that restored her work. However, on June 1, 2020, the District Court dismissed 
Noland's complaint on different grounds. Noland v. Janssen, No. 17-CV-5452 (JPO), 2020 WL 
2836464 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2020). At the time of writing, it is unclear whether Noland will 
appeal this decision. 
 183. Daniel Grant, Artistic Paternity: When and How Artists Can Disavow Their Work, 
OBSERVER (July 28, 2016, 10:17 AM), https://observer.com/2016/07/artistic-paternity-
when-and-how-artists-can-disavow-their-work/ (comparing the limitation on liability 
under VARA to the artists’ ability to disown their work by noting that “[t]he right to disclaim 
authorship, however, has fewer impediments”). 
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world to consider them inauthentic, which drastically diminishes 
their value.184 
Artists can disown their works for an even simpler reason: they 
just do not like them anymore or believe that they no longer 
represent their artistic vision. Consider, for example, the case of 
Richard Prince, who is considered by some to be the most 
important artist since Andy Warhol.185 In 1988, Prince disowned all 
his work created before the late 1970s. He noted that he had 
destroyed all works from that period that were in his possession 
and stated that he does not regard works from that period as 
representing his vision, stating that “I didn’t like the work I did 10 
or so years ago.”186 Prince’s website, as well as the website of his 
leading dealer, Barbara Gladstone, do not list a single work or 
exhibit before 1979, when he was thirty years old.187 
Many in the art world—although, as further discussed below, 
not everyone—respect Prince’s wishes. The Guggenheim 
Museum’s website, for example, dates Prince’s career from 1980 on 
and does not list any work or style of his before the late 1970s.188 
The Whitney Museum of American Art, which staged the last 
retrospective of Prince in 1992, did not include in it a single early 
work by the artist.189 Nancy Spector, a current curator at the 
Guggenheim who put together the Prince retrospective, stated that 
the museum “tend[s] to respect the artist’s wishes” when selecting 
works for an exhibition.190 The Walker Art Center in Minneapolis, 
Minnesota, which owns several of Prince’s works from that early 
era, agreed to lend them to others, but it will not present those 
 
 184. See id. (“The audience for disclaiming authorship of an artwork is not just its 
current owner but future buyers who may be dissuaded from purchasing something that the 
artist claims has been distorted or mutilated.”). 
 185. See, e.g., Carol Vogel, For Those Who Can Afford It, Christie’s Is Selling Anxiety, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 26 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/27/arts/design/a-christies-
contemporary-art-auction-with-an-edge.html. 
 186. Daniel Grant, Can Artists Really Disown Their Early Work?, HUFFPOST (Aug. 11, 
2010, 7:49 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-grant/can-artists-really-disown_ 
b_678184.html. 
 187. RICHARD PRINCE, http://www.richardprince.com (last visited Apr. 28, 2020); 
Biography of Richard Prince, GLADSTONE GALLERY, https://gladstonegallery.com/ 
artist/richard-prince/biography (last visited Apr. 28, 2020). 
 188. Richard Prince, GUGGENHEIM, https://www.guggenheim.org/artwork/artist/ 
richard-prince (last visited Apr. 28, 2020). 
 189. Grant, supra note 186. 
 190. Id. 
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works at the museum. Siri Engberg, its curator, explained that 
“[i]t’s important to maintain a close relationship with the artist.”191 
She noted that “[t]he gesture of disavowal may be a way [for the 
artist] to regain . . . control [of their work]” and to signal that some 
of the artist’s works are “not part of an artist’s conceptual plan.”192 
In 2017 Richard Prince did it again, although for a slightly 
different reason. In January, just days before the inauguration of 
then President-elect Donald Trump, he disowned a work he created 
for Ivanka Trump. Prince disowned the work by calling it “fake” 
and returning the payment, $36,000, he received for it.193 Prince 
stated that disowning the work was an act of protest against the 
Trump family.194 
Richard Prince is, of course, not the only prominent artist  
to disown his prior works that were no longer to his liking. 
Additional examples include Pablo Picasso, who disowned a 
painting he allegedly drew as a “joke”;195 Gerhard Richter, the 
abstract artist, who—much like Prince—disowned his early and 
more realistic works;196 and even Felix Gonzalez-Torres, who 
disowned several works he created, calling them “additional 
material” and “non-works.”197 
C. The Flexibility of Social Norms 
Social norms are typically characterized by their potential for 
flexibility, if the industry participants choose to make them so.198 
 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Randy Kennedy, Richard Prince, Protesting Trump, Returns Art Payment, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/12/arts/design/richard-prince-
protesting-trump-returns-art-payment.html. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Grant, supra note 183. 
 196. Fincham, supra note 32, at 594. 
 197. Grant, supra note 186. 
 198. Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression, Deterrence, and 
Internalization, 79 OR. L. REV. 1, 21 (2000) (“Social norms have the advantages of 
flexibility . . . .”). Legal norms can offer some flexibility too—for example, by using more 
standard-based norms and fewer rule-based norms. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Rules and 
Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 400 (1985) (explaining that flexibility is a virtue of legal 
standards). In the context of copyright law, for example, the law achieves flexibility primarily 
through the fair use defense. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1163  
(9th Cir. 2007) (“We must be flexible in applying a fair use analysis.”); Gordon, supra note 99, 
at 1637 (“[T]he case-by-case flexibility of fair use allows the courts to weigh the value 
criterion in defendant’s favor only when they do feel equipped to make such judgments.”). 
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When it comes to its social norms, the art world shows flexibility 
regarding flexibility. Some norms, in particular those that resemble 
private property rights, show little flexibility. As noted above, I was 
unable to find an instance where a museum or a gallery exhibited a 
work, including a work that is a pure idea, without “owning” or 
“borrowing” it.199 Nor did any of my interviewees know of such an 
example. Those norms do not seem to have any exception. 
The norms regarding the artists’ post-sale control, on the other 
hand, are flexible, which makes the industry significantly more 
adaptable and susceptible to nuances than copyright law. Indeed, 
the norms of consultation and authentication are not always 
accepted and followed. While the art world rarely wholly ignores 
the artists’ desires, some are willing to take actions that are 
inconsistent with those wishes, especially when they are difficult to 
assess accurately or when they seem unreasonable. 
One important aspect of this flexibility has to do with works by 
deceased artists. When individuals die, most of their legal rights 
pass to their heirs. Their heirs can, and sometimes do, exercise those 
rights in a way that is inconsistent with the desire of the deceased.200 
Copyright is an example of a legal right that heirs can fully exercise 
as they desire, regardless of the deceased’s wishes.201 The heirs’ 
power does not diminish or disappear as long as copyright lasts, 
which is currently seventy years after the death of the author.202 
This means that in many cases the rights will be transferred several 
times, including to those who probably never met the author. 
The social norms of the art world work differently. Museums 
try to preserve the artist’s intent, but when it comes to deceased 
 
 199. See supra text accompanying note 151. 
 200. Property law includes legal mechanisms that are designed to curtail what is 
commonly referred to as “dead-hand control.” See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 844 F.2d 36, 
42 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Property law disfavors restraints on alienation and dead-hand control by 
prior owners.”). The most famous of those mechanisms is probably the rule against 
perpetuities. See, e.g., Jeffrey E. Stake, Darwin, Donations, and the Illusion of Dead Hand Control, 
64 TUL. L. REV. 705, 718–20 (1990). 
 201. See, e.g., Ray Charles Found. v. Robinson, 795 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2015) (allowing 
the heirs of Ray Charles to use their rights under the Copyright Act although that use 
circumvented the artist’s clear and expressed intent); cf. Andrew Gilden, IP, R.I.P., 95 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 639 (2017) (exploring various interests that the estate of deceased artists might 
promote). 
 202. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012); see also Ariel Katz, Substitution and Schumpeterian Effects 
over the Life Cycle of Copyrighted Works, 49 JURIMETRICS 113 (2009) (suggesting that copyright 
protection should be stronger shortly after the work is created and weaker later on). 
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artists, assessing that intent becomes more complex. The identity of 
the legal heir of the artist plays relatively little role in this process. 
Instead, museums seek input from individuals who should be most 
familiar with the artist. Ideally, artists leave behind foundations 
that are managed by those who knew them and their work during 
their lifetime. The artist’s former gallerists, dealers, and others who 
worked in the artist’s studios are valuable sources whose advice 
might be sought by presenting museums. But, in sharp contrast 
with copyright law, the social norms that require consultation with 
the artist’s foundation and former colleagues weaken over time 
and, in some circumstances, might eventually disappear. Industry 
insiders explain that they consult with an artist’s foundation or 
former colleagues because they are best positioned to know the 
artist’s intent. However, they also note that as those individuals 
retire or die, museums take a greater role in deciding for themselves 
how to express the artist’s intent.203 Similarly, over time, the role of 
the artist’s circle of acquaintances in authenticating a work is 
diminished as museums take a more significant role in this process, 
by, inter alia, maintaining documentation regarding the 
provenance of their works.204 In other words, unlike copyright law, 
the artistic post-sale control does not have a preset fixed term. 
This flexibility is not limited to deceased artists. Many industry 
insiders I spoke with are familiar with examples of museums that 
did not receive permission from an artist to exhibit a work, and 
even cases in which an exhibition presented a work against the 
 
 203. When it comes to conceptual art, the discussion regarding the diminished role of 
the artists’ foundations and heirs is looming, but still mostly theoretical. Conceptual art 
started to gain momentum in the late 1960s, which means that many leading conceptual 
artists are still alive or recently deceased. Therefore, their foundations and estates are still 
managed by those who knew them. This reality, however, will unavoidably change in the 
years to come. 
 204. See Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 STAN. L. REV. 275, 
360 (1982) (“Museums have a mission to help the search for truth about the art they possess. 
That mission entails searching for and acquiring as much information about provenance as 
possible . . . .”); Ronald D. Spencer & Judith Wallace, Museums and Museum Curators: Caught 
in the Cross-Hairs of Authenticity Disputes, in THE LEGAL GUIDE FOR MUSEUM PROFESSIONALS 
27, 32 (Julia Courtney ed., 2015) (explaining how foundations gradually stop dealing with 
authentication requests, partly because of liability risk, and how “[t]his leaves a void that 
museum curators may be asked to fill”). 
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artist’s desire.205 In some of those cases, the lack of permission 
required the museum to refrain from using an image of the artist’s 
work in its supporting materials, such as its website. Many industry 
insiders are familiar with examples, which are apparently rare but 
somewhat salient, of permissions that were denied, which led to the 
cancellation of an entire exhibition at great harm, both financially 
and to the reputation of the parties involved. 
Somewhat similarly, while some prominent museums refrain 
from presenting works that artists disowned because of their 
dislike of their old works, other museums are willing to exhibit 
them. In 2007, for example, the Neuberger Museum of Art at 
Purchase, New York, arranged an exhibit titled “Fugitive Artist: 
The Early Work of Richard Prince, 1974–77.”206 As the name 
suggests, that exhibit presented Richard Prince’s disowned works 
from the mid-1970s. Prince, of course, refused to cooperate in this 
exhibit, which limited the museum’s ability to use images of the 
work in its catalogs.207 The exhibition, nevertheless, was well 
received by the art world.208 Other museums, such as the Walker 
Art Center, which refrains from presenting Prince’s disowned 
works, were willing to loan them to be exhibited elsewhere.209 The 
industry insiders I spoke with found this issue difficult. Some of 
them noted that they think it is “in poor taste” to present a 
disowned work, although others said that “you can only disown a 
work you did not sell by destroying it.” Some stated that if their 
museum owned a disowned work it would just store it, while 
others suggested that lending it to third parties would be 
 
 205. See, e.g., Kate Taylor, National Portrait Gallery Rejects Artist’s Request to Remove His 
Work, N.Y. TIMES: ARTSBEAT (Dec. 20, 2010, 2:20 PM), https://artsbeat.blogs. 
nytimes.com/2010/12/20/national-portrait-gallery-rejects-artists-request-to-remove-his-
work/ (reporting on how the National Portrait Gallery in Washington refused to remove a 
work by AA Bronson from an existing exhibition). Bronson asked for his work to be removed 
after the museum’s highly criticized decision to censor a work by another artist, David 
Wojnarowicz. Id. The lender of Bronson’s work, the National Gallery of Canada, publicly 
supported the artist’s request and urged the Washington museum to respect it, but the 
National Portrait Gallery refused. Id. 
 206. The exhibit was covered by leading publications such as the New York Times  
Art and Design section. Roberta Smith, Tracing a Radical’s Progress, Without Any Help  
from Him, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/09/arts/ 
design/09prin.html. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Grant, supra note 186. 
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acceptable, and yet others noted that they would be willing to 
present it with a clear indication that the artist disowned the work. 
The market for disowned artworks similarly shows the 
complexity of the issue. The market treatment of disowned works 
varies and depends on the circumstances that led to the artist’s 
decision. If there is any doubt as to whether an artist created a work, 
the large auction houses will refuse to sell it.210 Several large auction 
houses refused to sell works that were disowned because the artists 
were displeased by their state, such as Cady Noland’s work 
Cowboys Milking.211 
On the other hand, the resistance to selling disowned art is 
much weaker when it is the result of the artist’s changed taste. 
Sotheby’s and Christie’s, for example, agreed to sell Richard 
Prince’s early works, even though they were disowned.212 The 
effect of the act of disowning on the market price of the work is 
similarly ambiguous. It is likely that, in most cases, disowning a 
work reduces its value.213 On the other hand, the act of disowning 
art may, under some circumstances, arm the work with additional 
meaning, which might even raise its price. For example, Joshua 
Holdeman, the former vice chairman of Sotheby’s, noted that 
Richard Prince’s disowned print of Ivanka Trump “will probably 
 
 210. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 175 (explaining that as soon as Peter Doig 
denied that a work was created by him, the auction houses refused to sell it). In some cases, 
probably not common, there could be doubts whether the artist is considered the one who 
created the work. For example, Andy Warhol routinely supervised works that were created 
by others in his studio and later signed them. The Andy Warhol Foundation typically 
considers those to be Warhol’s and they are sold as such. However, the Andy Warhol 
Authentication Board, appointed by the Andy Warhol Foundation, refused to authenticate 
several such works that were later, nevertheless, included in his official catalogue raisonné, 
which is typically also controlled by the Foundation. The auction houses consider those to 
be Warhol works and sold them as such. See Heymann, supra note 32, at 38–39. Those actions 
and the authentication policies of the Andy Warhol Foundation were subject to a bitter 
lawsuit. See Fincham, supra note 32, at 605–06. 
 211. See supra text accompanying note 115. 
 212. Grant, supra note 186. 
 213. For example, Andrea Rosen, the president of the Felix Gonzalez-Torres 
Foundation, referred to Gonzales-Torres’s disowned works by acknowledging that they are 
being sold occasionally at auctions, but she also noted that “‘[t]hey sell for less’ than the 
pieces the artist did view as constituting art.” Id. This phenomenon makes sense. As many 
museums and industry insiders refuse to present disowned works, and as it is more difficult 
to authenticate or exhibit them, the demand for them is lower. 
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end up being a more culturally rich object than if this whole episode 
[hadn’t] happened” and that it might increase in value.214 
Finally, but importantly, in some respects, the scope of the 
artists’ rights under the social norms is quite narrow, as they apply 
to the artists’ work but not to closely similar works. My 
interviewees mentioned that while they will never ignore pseudo 
personal property rights (i.e., present a work they did not buy or 
borrow), and while they typically consult with artists before 
presenting their works, these norms only apply to the work itself. 
If Bob creates a work that is inspired by and is very similar to Alice’s 
work, then—as far as the social norms are concerned—Bob’s work 
can be purchased or presented without consulting with Alice.215 
Limiting the scope of an artist’s rights to her work alone and 
excluding any rights over substantially similar works puts  
the social norms of the art world in an interesting tension with the 
corresponding legal norms. Legal rights over intangible property—
including copyright—are not limited to literal copying.  
Judge Learned Hand famously observed that copyright “cannot be 
limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by 
immaterial variations.”216 Under copyright law, if the defendant 
copies protected elements of the plaintiff’s work, and if the 
defendant’s work is substantially similar to the plaintiff’s work, 
copyright is prima facie infringed.217 
The social norms of the art world are different, as they perceive 
two works by two artists, even if visually identical, to be different 
from one another. One is an authentic work by one artist, and the 
other an authentic work by another. Therefore, the permission  
of one artist is not needed to use the work of another. The fine 
artists also typically respect those norms and rarely sue other fine 
 
 214. Kennedy, supra note 193; see also August Brown, Banksy Pranks Auction by Shredding 
Million-Dollar Painting. Now It May Be Worth Even More, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2018), 
https://www.latimes.com/entertainment/la-et-cm-banksy-shreds-painting-20181006-
story.html (explaining that when Banksy, the famous street artist, publicly partly destroyed 
one of his paintings he likely significantly increased its value by giving it a special meaning 
in the history of fine art). 
 215. One curator cynically asked me when I inquired about this practice: “You know 
that we have works by appropriation artists in this museum, right?” The curator was, of 
course, referring to the tendency of appropriation artists to present works that are nearly 
identical to the originals on which they are based. 
 216. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 217. Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1116–17 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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artists for creating works that are substantially similar to theirs, 
even if those actions constitute copyright infringement.218 It is thus 
not surprising that most of the litigated disputes surrounding 
visual art in recent years concerned conflicts between 
appropriation artists and individuals from outside the fine art 
world, primarily photographers.219 
*** 
 
 218. Picasso and his estate, for example, do not engage in legal actions against dozens 
of artists who create and present, in many cases without authorization, derivative works of 
Picasso paintings. For example, the author recently attended an exhibit at Musée Picasso in 
Paris that was dedicated to perhaps Picasso’s most famous work—Guernica. The original 
work was on exhibit at Museo Reina Sofia in Madrid, but the museum in Paris presented 
pictures of the work and a full-size engraving titled Garage Day Revisited by Damien 
Deroubaix that was almost identical to the original work by Picasso. There is no doubt that 
under copyright law Deroubaix’s work infringes the copyright in Guernica. But the art world, 
including Musée Picasso, considers it an authentic, unproblematic work by Deroubaix. 
Picasso’s estate, however, uses a different standard for those outside of the fine art 
world. For example, it famously threatened to sue James Cameron, the producer of Titanic, 
and was eventually paid licensing fees for including an image of Picasso’s Les Demoiselles 
d’Avignon in the movie. Patricia Cohen, Art Is Long; Copyrights Can Even Be Longer, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/25/arts/design/artists-rights-society-
vaga-and-intellectual-property.html. The motivation for the lawsuit was not purely 
financial, as the Picasso estate wanted to punish the movie creators for falsely implying that 
the work, which has been part of the permanent collection of the Museum of Modern Art in 
New York for decades, was on board the Titanic and thus lost. Milton Esterow, The Battle for 
Picasso’s Multi-Billion-Dollar Empire, VANITY FAIR (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www. 
vanityfair.com/culture/2016/03/picasso-multi-billion-dollar-empire-battle. 
 219. Richard Prince was famously sued by the photographer Patrick Cariou for using 
his photographs in an exhibition at the Gagosian Gallery in New York. Cariou v. Prince, 714 
F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). Shortly after the Second Circuit’s decision, which held that most of 
Prince’s works were fair use, Prince got himself in legal troubles again when, in 2014, he 
exhibited copies of Instagram posts without permission. Four lawsuits—three from 
photographers and one from a make-up artist—soon followed. Beatrice Kelly, The (Social) 
Media is the Message: Theories of Liability for New Media Artists, 40 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 503,  
505 (2017). Two of the complaints were settled. Kelly, supra. At the time of writing, the 
proceedings in the two other cases are continuing. 
Prince is not the only prominent contemporary artist who has been sued for using 
copyrighted materials that were created by those who are not part of the fine art world. For 
example, Jeff Koons, the most commercially successful living visual artist in the world, has 
been sued multiple times for copyright infringement. See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 
(2d Cir. 2006) (holding that Koons’s use of a fashion photograph was fair use); Rogers v. 
Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that Koons infringed the copyright in a 
photograph); United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 
(holding that Koons infringed the copyright of a graphic designer); see also Amy Adler, Fair 
Use and the Future of Art, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 559 (2016) (exploring the application of the fair 
use defense in copyright lawsuits against contemporary artists); Adler, supra note 32, at 361 
(suggesting, after exploring the recent legal battles over fine art, that they are not needed for 
the progress of art). 
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To summarize: The social norms of the art world fill a gap that 
the legal system creates. They attribute property-like rights to every 
artwork, whether or not the law recognizes such rights, including 
when the work is nothing more than an idea. In addition, they 
allow all artists to exercise a certain level of post-sale control over 
the use of their works. These norms create something—rights for 
the artists—in legal nothingness. 
IV. THE NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF RIGHTS  
OVER LEGAL NOTHINGNESS 
The previous Part explores, in depth, the social norms of the art 
world that allow artists to be compensated for and be involved in 
the use of their works. Those norms apply whether or not 
copyright, or any other legal norm, incentivizes or otherwise 
protects those works. As such, the art world provides artists with 
rights in legal nothingness. This Part discusses some of the 
normative implications of those social norms. 
Section A analyzes the impact of recognizing pseudo property 
rights in all artworks, including pure ideas. The section compares 
the social norms to the legal norms and argues that the social norms 
incentivize idea creation in a relatively efficient way. Sections B and 
C zoom out and suggest that the social norms of the art world shed 
light on and put into question more general legal concepts. Section 
B explains that the norms of the art world expose some of the 
shortcomings of the legal notion of authorship, a cornerstone 
concept in copyright law. Indeed, authorship, as currently applied 
by courts, is built on a perception of creativity which is suitable to 
some creative industries but not to others. The section suggests how 
authorship can be revised by taking into account the richer account 
of creativity that this Article explores. 
Section C suggests that the art world perceives private property 
ownership in a flexible way that is partly inconsistent with certain 
legal notions and rules. Developments in the market and in existing 
technology, like the emergence of the sharing economy, similarly 
question existing property law norms. Therefore, the section 
explains that it might be appropriate to reconsider certain aspects 
in our legal norms concerning private property ownership. 
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A. Incentivizing Ideas’ Creation Efficiently 
The social norms of the art world recognize property-like 
ownership in legal nothingness: that is, works consisting of pure 
ideas. The immediate effect of those norms is to provide an answer 
to the question this Article posed at the end of Part II: How do Felix 
Gonzalez-Torres and artists like him earn a living from their 
acclaimed dematerialized works? If artists are considered the 
“owners” of the works they create, and if no art institute will 
present that work without purchasing or borrowing it, then the 
artists must be paid for their works. Indeed, this is the main source 
of income of visual artists, including Gonzalez-Torres and other 
artists who create pure-idea works. 
This regime is especially effective because of the strongly 
shared norms among industry insiders—collectors, museum 
administrators, gallery owners, curators, and so on. Fine art is 
mostly consumed through museums and galleries, which places 
their curators and administrators in a strong gatekeeping position. 
In other words, there is no de facto free entry into this market by 
outsiders who disrespect the industry norms. It is mostly 
impossible to bypass that ecosystem and the close-knit society of 
individuals who foster and promote those social norms. 
As a result, those social norms and the pseudo property  
rights they create close a certain gap in the way that our  
legal system incentivizes creativity. Creativity comes in many 
forms. For our purposes, it is enough to note that individuals  
can come up with creative ideas, execute ideas in creative ways,  
or do both. Copyright protection, however, attaches only to  
creative execution.220 In other words, if Alice comes up with a 
creative idea and Bob executes it in a creative way, Bob’s creative 
contribution is protected by copyright, but Alice’s is not. 
Developing ideas, however, takes time and involves resources. 
If ideas escape legal protection, how are ideas’ creators incentivized 
to develop them? Often, the legal system indirectly incentivizes this 
activity. First and foremost, in many cases, protecting the execution 
also provides adequate incentive for ideas’ development. This is 
especially true in the rather common case in which the same 
individual comes up with both the idea and its execution, and when 
 
 220. See also supra note 128. 
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the main value of the work is in that execution, while the idea 
embodied therein is trivial.221 For example, the idea of painting the 
sky over a village at night is not very creative or unique, but  
Van Gogh’s execution of The Starry Night is considered one of the 
greatest artworks in history. The idea of a battle between a young 
hero who is learning the ways of the trade and an older, more 
experienced villain is not particularly interesting or new, nor is the 
idea about a group of youngsters learning to use their magic 
powers.222 But J.K. Rowling’s expression of those ideas when she 
wrote the Harry Potter books made her the most famous and the 
richest author of our time.223 In those cases, leaving the ideas that 
are expressed in The Starry Night or Harry Potter in the public 
domain and making them free for others to take causes no real 
harm to the creators’ income. 
In other cases, if the idea is developed by one individual and 
executed by another, the law can still incentivize ideas’ creation.  
A host of legal doctrines, collectively called “the law of ideas,” 
protect idea developers against the misappropriation of their 
creativity.224 Most cases concerning the law of ideas revolve around 
“idea submission” disputes. The defendant in those cases created a 
 
 221. The line between ideas and expression is of course blurry. See Oravec v. Sunny 
Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218, 1224 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[T]here is no bright line 
separating the ideas conveyed by a work from the specific expression of those ideas.”); see 
also supra note 128. This known difficult problem, however, does not affect the analysis in 
this section and is beyond the scope of this work. 
 222. There are multiple examples of those ideas in popular works that predate Harry 
Potter. The idea of fights between pure good and pure evil is at least as old as the Bible and 
Greek mythology. In modern popular culture, that idea plays a major role in most comic 
books. The idea of a group of youngsters who are learning to use their special powers is also 
old and in modern times is expressed in such works as the X-Men series, Terry Pratchett’s 
Discworld Series, and Jane Yolen’s Wizard’s Hall. The idea of combining the two is of course 
not new either. The similarity in ideas between Star Wars and Harry Potter is well-known. 
The important observation is, however, that copying ideas is not only a common practice, 
but it typically does not significantly harm the market for the earlier work. 
 223. Karissa Giuliano & Sarah Whitten, The World’s First Billionaire Author Is Cashing In, 
CNBC (July 31, 2015), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/07/31/the-worlds-first-billionaire-
author-is-cashing-in.html. 
 224. The term “law of ideas” was coined in Melville B. Nimmer, The Law of Ideas, 27 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 119 (1954). See also Robert C. Denicola, The New Law of Ideas, 28 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 195, 205 (2014) (“Idea creators have invoked a dazzling array of legal theories in their 
attempts to stop unauthorized use, with varying degrees of success.”); Miller, supra note 23. 
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final product—for example, a children’s toy,225 a movie,226 a TV 
series,227 or a commercial campaign.228 However, the idea for those 
endeavors allegedly originated from the plaintiff who did not 
directly benefit from its commercialization. The law of ideas allows 
the idea developers to recover the value of their contribution to the 
final product. As a practical matter, the law of ideas, nevertheless, 
protects only non-public ideas.229 
This indirect incentivization scheme leaves out works whose 
value primarily lies in the idea and not in its expression, such as 
dematerialized conceptual artworks. Protecting their execution, 
which is typically trivial,230 and leaving the most creative part 
thereof—the idea—in the public domain for others to freely copy, 
can significantly undermine the incentives to create those ideas. 
This is where the social norms of the art world step in by 
providing pseudo-ownership over public ideas. Indeed, this 
regime seems to provide a sophisticated, effective, and, as we shall 
 
 225. See, e.g., Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 
2003); Nadel v. Play-By-Play Toys & Novelties, Inc., 208 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 226. See, e.g., Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 1307–08 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d, 738 
F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1984); Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257 (Cal. 1956). 
 227. See, e.g., Forest Park Pictures v. Universal Television Network, 683 F.3d 424, 436 
(2d Cir. 2012); Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, 649 F.3d 975, 981 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 228. See, e.g., Wrench, L.L.C. v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 459 (6th Cir. 2001);  
Garrido v. Burger King Corp., 558 So. 2d 79, 83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). 
 229. Some of the limitations on the protection of public ideas are doctrinal. See, e.g., 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) (“Information that is public 
knowledge or that is generally known in an industry cannot be a trade secret.”); Nadel, 208 
F.3d at 373, 378, 380 (Sotomayor, J.) (noting that “property-based” causes of action for 
protection ideas, such as misappropriation of quasi-property rights or conversion, require 
that the idea will be “novel in absolute terms” because the law “does not protect against the 
use of that which is free and available to all”). Moreover, if the law of ideas would have 
provided property-like protection for public ideas, it might have been preempted by the 
Copyright Act. See, e.g., SCO Grp., Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 879 F.3d 1062, 1080 (10th 
Cir. 2018); GlobeRanger Corp. v. Software AG United States of Am., Inc., 836 F.3d 477, 488 
(5th Cir. 2016). 
Contracts, in theory, can regulate non-public ideas. But, in practice, relying on 
contracts to protect public ideas entails a host of issues. It is possible that a contract over 
public ideas might not be supported by consideration, especially if the idea is known to both 
parties. Nadel, 208 F.3d at 380. In addition, a contracts plaintiff needs to prove privity, tackle 
contractual defenses, such as unconscionability and public policy, and handle the 
reputational harm involved in enforcing such an oppressive contract. See Guy A. Rub, 
Copyright Survives: Rethinking the Copyright-Contract Conflict, 103 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1209–18 
(2017) (exploring those limitations on contracts over information goods). Indeed, I am not 
familiar with any proceedings in which a plaintiff tried, successfully or not, to use a contract 
to prevent the use of publicly available and known ideas. 
 230. See supra Section I.B. 
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see, an efficient way to fill this gap in our legal system. To use the 
terminology set forth by Kal Raustiala and Chris Sprigman, the law 
leaves a negative space in which it does not provide incentives for 
creativity,231 and that space is then filled by the social norms’ 
pseudo personal property regime. 
It is probably more efficient to have the gap in our current legal 
framework filled by social norms rather than by any form of 
creativity-protection property rights, especially copyright-like 
rights over ideas.232 Indeed, as far as copyright law is concerned, 
ideas need to stay free in the public domain. 
 
 231. Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 38, at 1764 (explaining that the negative space is 
“a substantial area of creativity into which copyright and patent do not penetrate and for 
which trademark provides only very limited propertization”). Raustiala and Sprigman 
studied the social norms of the world of fashion. In recent years, other scholars examined the 
negative space in other industries. See, e.g., David Fagundes & Aaron Perzanowski, Clown 
Eggs, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1313 (2019) (exploring the social norms that support the 
decoration of egg clowns); Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh 
(Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up 
Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787 (2008) (analyzing the social norms advancing the creation of 
jokes); Zahr K. Said, Craft Beer and The Rising Tide Effect: An Empirical Study of Sharing and 
Collaboration Among Seattle’s Craft Breweries, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 355 (2019) (studying 
the norms among Seattle’s craft breweries). 
The focus in this section, and the main focus of this Article, is on the operation of the 
social norms of the art world in that negative space. However, this Article also clarifies that 
the social norms of the art world are not limited to that negative space, and that they operate 
even with respect to those parts of the art world that, unlike conceptual art, are subject to 
legal norms, including intellectual property law. See, e.g., supra notes 216–19 and 
accompanying text. 
 232. While the claims made in this section are important, one should not lose sight of 
their limitations. The question that the rest of this section asks is whether property law, 
especially copyright, can incentivize idea creation better than the industry currently does.  
In other words, is a legal reform needed? It explains that the answer to both questions is no. 
This, by itself, does not mean that the system of social norms, and in particular the pseudo 
personal property regime, is perfect or costless. Cf. Bair & Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 38 
(claiming that many scholars of social norms in creative industries compare them only to 
fictional IP regimes, although they might raise other issues, including some that go beyond 
IP law). 
One can raise multiple questions regarding the overall desirability of the social norms 
scheme that this Article describes. For example, is it possible that it provides too strong of 
incentives? Such a phenomenon was studied in some industries. See, e.g., Richard H. 
McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 419–24 
(1997). Discovering the efficient level of incentives is not a simple question to answer. In 
tackling such a question, it is important to keep in mind that the art world (like many other 
industries in the 21st century) is not purely driven by market powers. The government 
intervenes in the market in multiple ways, including, for example, direct financial support 
to many museums and significant tax benefits to non-profit institutes, including practically 
all museums. 
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The relative efficiency of the social norms comes from the low 
social costs that this form of protection entails. To appreciate the 
likely superiority of the pseudo personal property regime, one 
must understand why copyright law leaves this negative space and 
why it would be difficult to come up with a legal rule that would 
fill that gap. Extending copyright protection to ideas would be 
exceptionally socially costly. Protecting ideas would give existing 
authors much stronger monopoly power, which would 
dramatically shrink the public domain—the library of preexisting 
information goods that can be used in future creations.233 Once 
ideas are protected, it would become significantly more difficult for 
new creators to “create around” existing works and enrich our 
world with new works.234 Moreover, as the Supreme Court 
explained, if copyright law were to protect ideas, it might  
conflict with the right of free speech as guaranteed by the  
First Amendment.235 
Devising a narrower sui generis property regime over some 
public ideas, such as ideas that are used in conceptual art 
installations, would be extremely challenging. First, the 
constitutionality of such an act is questionable. It is not clear that 
Congress is authorized by Article I to extend copyright beyond 
 
Moreover, as section III.A explains, the social norms create artificial scarcity. So do 
property rights. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & 
ECON. 265, 275 (1977). And while this section suggests that society should prefer the first 
over the latter, one cannot rule out that a solution that does not entail scarcity at all might be 
preferable. For example, the government can pay conceptual artists for their creativity and 
allow anyone to use their works in a non-rivalrous way. In that way, instead of having one 
copy of a Felix Gonzalez-Torres work, located in a specific museum, every museum 
interested in conceptual art would present it. Wouldn’t that be better for consumers of fine 
art? Such an approach, of course, entails a host of other difficulties. For example, is it justified 
to spend taxpayers’ money on conceptual art? And how does such a scheme affect free 
artistic expression in a free society? In the context of fine art, patronage has significant social 
costs, mainly because it is, and always has been, linked to censorship. See, e.g., Neil 
Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 353 (1996). 
As I hope this note makes clear, assessing the overall desirability of the social norms 
of the art world goes well beyond the scope of this Article. In fact, it is doubtful that such an 
inquiry can be completed without assessing the overall operation of the art world itself and 
the government’s effects on it and related markets. 
 233. See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 968 (1990) (explaining the 
importance of a robust public domain to future creators). 
 234. See Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1337 
(2015) (explaining how copyright law channels future creativity). 
 235. Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 328 (2012). 
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expressions,236 and it is similarly doubtful that such an act would 
survive First Amendment scrutiny.237 Second, even if Congress is 
allowed to pass such legislation, it would be exceptionally difficult, 
probably impossible, to accurately define the scope of such a right. 
Indeed, the drafting of such a bill would be problematic. VARA 
provides an analogy to this challenge. VARA bestowed moral 
rights only to fine artworks, but its attempt to do so resulted in 
repeated litigation at the margins. Time and again courts are asked 
to decide if certain works—such as photographs or alleged applied 
art—fall under the scope of VARA or not.238 
The challenge here is significantly more complex than the one 
that the VARA drafters faced. First, sui generis legislation would 
need to identify the works whose ideas it protects. As explained 
throughout this Article, there are many forms of fine art that do not 
need idea protection—from a Van Gogh painting to Duchamp’s 
Fountain. Second, the drafters would need to identify which ideas 
within any work should be protected and to what extent. 
Obviously, the law does not need to limit an individual’s ability to 
buy 175 pounds of candies for a party, but creating a legislative 
scheme that would separate such a case from now-unauthorized 
copying of “Untitled” (Portrait of Ross in L.A.), which consists of  
 
 236. The Supreme Court typically read Congress’s authority under the IP Clause of the 
Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, quite broadly. E.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 
208–10 (2003) (holding that Congress’s authority to enact copyright protected for “limited 
Times” does not preclude extending the protection period from time to time); Burrow-Giles 
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 56–58 (1884) (holding that Congress’s authority to 
grant exclusive rights over “writings” extends to photographs). However, the Court  
has never considered an attempt to protect ideas, and it is therefore unclear whether it would 
agree that Congress’s authority to protect “writings,” as the term is used in the IP Clause, 
extends that far. It is similarly unclear whether Congress can bypass such limitations on its 
power under the IP Clause, if they exist, and pass copyright-like laws using its commerce 
power. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see, e.g., Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and 
Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272, 274 (2004) (“The overwhelming view  
among commentators is that the Intellectual Property Clause’s limits apply to all of 
Congress’s powers . . . .”). 
 237. See supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
 238. See, e.g., Cheffins v. Stewart, 825 F.3d 588, 591 (9th Cir. 2016) (considering  
whether a mobile replica of a 16th-century Spanish galleon, built from a used school bus, is 
protected under VARA); Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 291–92 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(considering whether a wildflower garden is protected under VARA); Kleinman v. City of 
San Marcos, 597 F.3d 323, 324 (5th Cir. 2010) (considering whether a wrecked car that has 
been painted and put to use as a cactus planter is protected under VARA); Lilley v. Stout, 
384 F. Supp. 2d 83, 85–89 (D.D.C. 2005) (considering whether an artistic photograph is 
protected under VARA). 
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175 pounds of candies, would be challenging. The risk of overbroad 
legislation, which would unnecessarily shrink the public domain 
and might harm free speech, would make the legislative  
endeavor grueling. 
Lastly, there is no need for a legislative reform that will provide 
property-like protection to ideas, because the current system seems 
to operate adequately.239 The pseudo personal property regime 
carefully addresses the challenges that might be unresolvable in a 
legislative reform. Because the social norms are shared by the fine 
art world, but not beyond it, the rights themselves are applicable 
only to the type of fine artists whose works are exhibited in 
museums and galleries. It, therefore, does not present the same 
overbreadth problem associated with federal laws. Moreover, the 
scheme is limited to the type of copying that harms artists while 
allowing others to create around it.240 The social norms thus offer a 
level of flexibility that a legislative scheme typically lacks. 
B. Recalibrating Copyright Authorship 
The art world’s perception of authorship is rich and complex, 
and it challenges the ways in which the term is understood under 
copyright law. Comparing the social norms of this industry and 
copyright law’s account of authorship sheds light on certain 
underlying assumptions in our legal system and might require 
recalibration of existing legal tests. Indeed, while the previous 
section of this Article suggests that the law should not protect 
public ideas, this section notes that the law concerning the 
protection of expressed ideas might need slight recalibration. 
Authorship is an important and complex concept in copyright 
law. Therefore, it is not surprising that it attracts much attention 
from courts and scholars.241 Authors are the stars of our copyright 
system. The IP Clause of the Constitution authorized Congress to 
“[S]ecur[e] . . . to authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings,”242 and the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that one 
 
 239. Of course, the superiority of the current system does not mean it cannot be 
improved, as suggested in the rest of this Part. 
 240. See supra text accompanying notes 216–18. 
 241. See, e.g., supra note 42. 
 242. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
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of the primary goals of copyright law is to “protect the author’s 
incentive to create.”243 
The Copyright Act provides that authors are the initial owners 
of the copyright in a work.244 Identifying the author, or authors, is 
therefore crucial when disputes arise among individuals who 
contributed to the creation of a final product. Those disputes 
require copyright law to figure out who among a group of creators 
should be considered the author—which turns out to be a difficult 
question. Those situations are not rare. A movie, for example, 
benefits from the creativity of the producer, director, screenwriters, 
actors, photographers, lighting director, costume designers, and 
many more.245 Authorship determines who within this large group 
is elevated and receives property rights in the final product and 
who is left out.246 Similar questions arise in many other forms of 
creativity, from music247 to software,248 and more. 
Authorship has received growing attention in the 21st century. 
For example, copyright law’s tendency to deny most performing 
artists (e.g., vocalists and actors) authorship status has been harshly 
criticized in recent years, especially on equitable grounds.249  
In 2012, partly in response to those claims, the World Intellectual 
 
 243. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. 417, 450 (1984); see also 
N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U. S. 483, 524 (2001). 
 244. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012) (“Copyright . . . vests initially in the author . . . of  
the work.”). 
 245. See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 742–43 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
 246. See, e.g., 16 Casa Duse, L.L.C. v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that a 
producer and not a director is the author); Garcia, 786 F.3d at 742–43 (holding that the movie 
producer and director is the sole author and not an actor); Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 
1227 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a director and not an advisor on set is the author). 
 247. See, e.g., Guy A. Rub, Stronger Than Kryptonite? Inalienable Profit-Sharing Schemes in 
Copyright Law, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 116–17 (2013) (discussing how, under some 
circumstances, band members and even sound mixers can be considered joint authors). 
 248. See, e.g., Clark D. Asay, Software’s Copyright Anticommons, 66 EMORY L.J. 265,  
293 (2017). 
 249. E.g., Tuneen E. Chisolm, Whose Song is That? Searching for Equity and Inspiration for 
Music Vocalists Under the Copyright Act, 19 YALE J.L. & TECH. 274 (2017); F. Jay Dougherty, 
Not a Spike Lee Joint? Issues in the Authorship of Motion Pictures Under U.S. Copyright Law,  
49 UCLA L. REV. 225 (2001). But see Justin Hughes, Actors as Authors in American Copyright 
Law, 51 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2019) (suggesting that under existing copyright law, actors may be 
considered authors). See generally 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(5)(A) (2018) (setting forth a voluntary 
mechanism to compensate “a producer, mixer, or sound engineer who was part of the 
creative process that created a sound recording,” a provision added to the Copyright Act in 
October 2018 as part of the Music Modernization Act, to better compensate all those who 
participate in the creative process). 
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Property Organization (WIPO) adopted the Beijing Treaty on 
Audiovisual Performances.250 In addition, modern technology, 
which fosters large-scale collaborative projects, such as Linux and 
Wikipedia, further challenges existing notions of authorship.251 
Copyright law has developed complex tests to tackle 
authorship.252 The heart of those tests has to do with control during 
the creative process. The Ninth Circuit, for example, noted that “an 
author ‘superintends’ the work by exercising control[,]”253 and 
while authorship is a multi-factor inquiry, “[c]ontrol in many cases 
will be the most important factor.”254 But control over what? The 
Supreme Court answered that an author controls the fixation of the 
work: “[T]he author is the party who actually creates the work, that 
is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression 
entitled to copyright protection.”255 The result is that the individual 
who made the choices regarding the expressive elements in the 
work by fixing them, or by controlling their fixation, is the author. 
In many contexts this rule makes sense. Copyright law elevates 
fixation of original expressive elements.256 It, therefore, follows that 
those who make such contributions will be granted legal rights. 
Moreover, this rule incentivizes those parts of the creative process 
that are exceptionally socially desirable and that are commonly 
resource-consuming: expressing ideas and fixing them.257 
However, in some circumstances, placing the entire weight of 
our copyright law system on the fixation of expressive ideas is 
questionable. For example, as already noted, many have claimed 
 
 250. Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, supra note 42. The treaty entered into 
force on April 28, 2020, after it was approved by 30 countries. Beijing Notification No. 31: 
Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (Jan. 28, 2020), https:// 
www.wipo.int/treaties/en/notifications/beijing/treaty_beijing_31.html. 
 251. Kaminski & Rub, supra note 42, at 1126–27. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000) (footnotes omitted). 
 254. Id. 
 255. Cmty. for Creative Non–Violence v. Reid, 490 U. S. 730, 737 (1989) (emphasis 
added); see also Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 744 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
 256. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”). 
 257. See Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 723 (2003) 
(“One virtue of fixation is that it increases the likelihood that the relevant expression will be 
passed from place to place, person to person, and generation to generation.”); supra text 
accompanying notes 221–22 (explaining that in many cases the value of the work is mainly 
attributed to its expressions and not its ideas). 
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that this approach unfairly minimizes the contribution of 
performers and their creative choices.258 
Conceptual art provides an even starker example for the 
shortcomings of the current approach to copyright authorship and 
its oversimplified underlying assumptions. As explained, under 
copyright law, the author is the one who “translates an idea into a 
fixed, tangible expression,” or in other words, controls the fixation 
of the expressive elements of the work.259 Applying this rule to 
conceptual artworks, however, leads to absurd results.  
For example, Felix Gonzalez-Torres came up with the idea to 
“Untitled” (Portrait of Ross in L.A.),260 but he did not exercise any 
control over the fixation of that idea. In fact, he did not even 
determine the attributions of that expression but left those simple 
choices to those who execute his works, typically museum curators. 
As curators make those choices (for example, whether to place the 
candies in a square or a circle), they control the fixation process, 
and, if the result is protected by copyright,261 they—the curators—
are the authors. 
Any fan of the arts, and even more so any industry insider, 
including every curator I spoke with, would find this result absurd, 
if not offensive. The work, as perceived by the art world, is the idea, 
and all rights in it should be given to the person who came up with 
that idea and not the individuals who execute it. Typically, the 
curators’ names will not even be mentioned next to the work and 
will be known to only a few of the exhibit goers. The candy 
installations are, as far as the social norms of the art world are 
concerned, a work by Felix Gonzalez-Torres. 
This gap between the industry perception and the law might 
require our legal system to come up with more sophisticated ways 
to determine authorship. Such a system could embrace a more 
holistic view of creativity, taking into account those cases in which 
 
 258. See supra note 249 and accompanying text. 
 259. Supra note 255 and accompanying text. 
 260. See supra text accompanying notes 74–80. 
 261. See supra text accompanying notes 131–34. It is unclear whether such an 
installation can be protected by copyright. It mostly depends on whether the aesthetic 
choices, made in this case by the curators, show a “creative spark[,]” thus meeting the 
required standard for originality. Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 
(1991); see also supra note 128. 
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a major artistic contribution might not express itself through 
control over the fixation process. 
The authorship caselaw includes clues for such a holistic 
approach. For example, the Ninth Circuit mentioned that one of the 
factors in determining authorship is whether “the audience appeal 
of the work turns on both contributions.”262 This factor opens the 
door for considering the views of third parties, for example, 
museum goers, and those they perceive to be the main contributors 
and the creators of the work. The Ninth Circuit, however, went on 
and explicitly held that this factor—the audience perspective—is 
not as important as the question of control,263 thus undermining the 
value of other factors. 
This Article, however, and the norms of the art world it 
explores, might put into question that preference—meaning,  
the current focus on control over fixation—and instead advocates 
for a more balanced approach. That approach might need to place 
more weight than is currently placed on the ways in which the 
audience and the industry perceive creative contribution, at times 
even at the expense of those who control the fixation process.  
The social norms of the pertinent industry can be used to inform 
such a determination. 
C. Challenging Private Property Ownership Standardization 
The social norms of the art world, and especially their treatment 
of conceptual art, can contribute to a deeper understanding of the 
notion of private property ownership and help shape intellectual 
property law. One of the thorny questions concerning private 
property ownership is whether and to what extent sellers of chattel 
can transfer ownership to a buyer while restricting that buyer’s 
(and future owners’) rights to transfer and/or freely use their 
purchased good. In other words, does the private property 
ownership interest of the buyers entail freedom from such 
limitations, or can sellers encumber the chattel? 
 
 262. Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 263. Id. 
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While this question has been debated in various contexts for 
centuries,264 it is taking a more central stage in legal discourse in 
recent years. One reason for this renewed interest has to do with 
changes in the law, especially in the context of items that are 
protected by intellectual property rights. Intellectual property law 
tries to preserve private property ownership, at least to a degree, 
through the doctrines of IP exhaustion. Those doctrines sever the 
link between the rights-owner/seller and the buyer by limiting the 
control that the rights-holder can exercise once an item is sold.265  
In the context of copyright law, exhaustion allows buyers to 
transfer their purchased copies (e.g., books and CDs) to others and, 
in certain circumstances, to publicly display them,266 but not to 
make copies thereof.267 This is part of the balance that copyright law 
aims to preserve between conflicting interests: the need of authors 
to be paid, especially when new copies are created, and the need of 
the buyers of specific copies to be allowed to exercise ownership 
interest and use those copies.268 
In recent years, in two important decisions, the Supreme Court 
broadened IP exhaustion, holding, inter alia, that neither a 
copyright holder nor a patentee can prevent unauthorized 
importation of IP protected chattel (e.g., books and medicines) 
 
 264. The most famous discussion of this issue was probably in Lord Coke’s 17th 
century treatise. EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF 
ENGLAND § 360, at 223 (London, Adam Islip 1628) (“[I]f a man be possessed of . . . a horse, or 
of any other chattell . . . and give or sell his whole interest . . . therein upon condition that the 
[d]onee or [v]endee shall not alien[ate] the same, the [condition] is voide, because his whole 
interest . . . is out of him.”); see also Rub, supra note 48, at 759–62 (discussing modern use of 
Lord Coke’s statement, from the partial critique in JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE 
ALIENATION OF PROPERTY (1895) to the Supreme Court’s favorable reliance in Kirtsaeng v. 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 538–39 (2013)). For modern in-depth discussion on the 
issue, see, e.g., Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449 (2004); 
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 906–24 (2008). 
 265. See Shubha Ghosh, The Implementation of Exhaustion Policies: Lessons from National 
Experiences, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Nov. 2013), https://www. 
ictsd.org/sites/default/files/downloads/2014/01/the-implementation-of-exhaustion-
policies.pdf (exploring various IP exhaustion regimes). 
 266. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2018). 
 267. See Capitol Records, L.L.C. v. ReDigi Inc., 910 F.3d 649, 657 (2d Cir. 2018) (“[T]he 
creation of such new phonorecords involves unauthorized reproduction, which is not 
protected, or even addressed, by [17 U.S.C.] § 109(a).”); see also Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 
569 U.S. 278 (2013) (holding a farmer liable for creating copies of patented grains). 
 268. See Rub, supra note 48, at 755. 
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purchased abroad.269 Those decisions disrupt well-established 
practices of many rights-holders, which are expected to try and find 
other ways to exercise legal post-sale control.270 This will likely 
generate additional litigation in the years to come. 
The ongoing policy debate concerning post-sale restrictions, 
especially on chattel that is protected by intellectual property 
rights, is complex, and a full analysis thereof is beyond the scope  
of this Article.271 One common argument in this debate, however, 
is that enforcing post-sale restraints is simply inconsistent with our 
notions of what private property ownership means and entails.  
The Supreme Court partly accepted this argument in its recent 
exhaustion caselaw when it relied on the common law aversion  
to restrictions on alienation272—an aversion that is rooted in  
those restrictions being “repugnant to the . . . fee.”273 Other 
commentators similarly claim that enforcing certain post-sale 
restrictions might mark “The End of Ownership,” and frustrate the 
reasonable expectation of buyers.274 
The focus on the nature of private property ownership relates 
to well-established legal norms that require property rights to be 
standardized and limited to a fixed number of forms.275 The 
common explanation for this rule of standardization is that it helps 
minimize transaction costs. Because property rights are in rem (i.e., 
binding on the entire society), the argument goes, it is important to 
 
 269. Impression Prod., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017); Kirtsaeng v. 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519 (2013). 
 270. Courts already allow right-holders to partly circumvent exhaustion. See, e.g., 
ReDigi, 910 F.3d at 655 (holding that a license is needed for reselling digitally downloaded 
songs); Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that a software 
company can prevent a buyer from unbundling and separately reselling a package of its 
software products). 
 271. See, e.g., Ariel Katz, Aaron Perzanowski & Guy A. Rub, The Interaction of Exhaustion 
and the General Law: A Reply to Duffy and Hynes, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 8, 24 (2016) (pointing 
to “various competing interests and considerations [that] should continue to inform the 
evolution of the law [of exhaustion]”). 
 272. See, e.g., Impression Products, 137 S. Ct. at 1532; Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 538–39; see also 
supra note 264 and accompanying text. 
 273. Rub, supra note 48, at 759–62. 
 274. AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP: PERSONAL 
PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (2016). 
 275. This rule exists in most legal systems. In Civil Law countries it is known as  
the “Numerus Clausus principle.” See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal 
Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1,  
3–4 (2000). 
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prevent unusual property forms. Otherwise, individuals will need 
to spend significant resources investigating the nature of the 
property rights by which they, like everyone else, are bound.276 
Creating idiosyncratic post-sale limitations might, therefore, 
undermine that principle and raise information costs. 
However, a broader view of private property ownership 
reveals a more complex reality. Lawrence Lessig’s famous pathetic 
dot theory suggests that behavior is shaped by four forces: the law, 
the market, physical and technological constraints (Lessig called 
them collectively “the architecture”), and social norms.277 In our 
context, the law’s attempt to simplify and limit the notion of private 
property ownership is undermined by the three other forces (the 
market, the technology, and the social norms). Together they 
present a richer and more flexible perception of ownership. 
Recent developments in the marketplace and in its architecture 
(i.e., the available technology) draw attention and undermine 
certain common views of private property. First, the growth of the 
sharing economy causes more and more consumers to purchase 
temporary services (e.g., Uber rides) at the expense of permanent 
ownership (e.g., buying a car), and thus weakens the centrality of 
private property ownership in our society.278 As one commentator 
bluntly put it, “Millennials are losing interest in ownership. They 
prefer to access property as needed on a casual, short-term basis.”279 
Second, the Internet of Things, where purchasers buy items that 
permanently rely on the sellers’ cloud services to operate properly, 
challenges the notion of private property ownership that is free of 
the seller’s post-sale control.280 Third, digital reading devices, like 
Amazon’s Kindle, similarly allow individuals to “buy” an e-book 
 
 276. Id. at 8. 
 277. LESSIG, supra note 50, at 121–25. 
 278. See, e.g., Fagundes, supra note 49, at 1380–94 (examining how the sharing economy, 
among others, challenges the notions of exclusion and possession of chattel); Kellen Zale, 
Sharing Property, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 501, 510 (2016) (discussing how the sharing economy 
blurs distinctions between property law categories that were previously clearer). 
 279. Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Share, Own, Access, 36 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 155, 155 (2017). 
 280. See, e.g., Christina Mulligan, Personal Property Servitudes on the Internet of Things,  
50 GA. L. REV. 1121 (2016) (discussing how the Internet of Things challenges the common law 
rules against servitudes on chattel). 
001.RUB_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/5/20  9:52 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
1216 
 
when, in fact, they are getting nothing more than an ability to access 
their “purchased item” on the corporation’s servers.281 
This Article provides another example of the flexibility of 
private property ownership, but one that is not rooted in the market 
or the architecture. Instead, it stems from Lessig’s fourth force: 
social norms. Specifically, the social norms of the art world that this 
Article explores, especially those concerning conceptual art, give 
artists such a pivotal role in decisions concerning the use of their 
sold works that they undermine the perception of a sale as a 
transfer of ownership rights that severs the sellers’ interest. 
Museums and collectors pay millions for works of art, but when 
they want to use their purchased goods, they—according to the 
well-established social norms of the industry—need to consult with 
the sellers-artists. This norm is especially strong for a sale of 
conceptual art, regardless of the price that the buyer paid, or was 
willing to pay, for the work. 
Take, for example, a typical Sol LeWitt wall painting. The work 
itself—the one that buyers pay a small fortune for282—consists of a 
set of instructions on how to execute a simplistic wall drawing.283 
However, my industry-insider interviewees explained that LeWitt 
and his estate do not just require that the painting be executed 
exactly according to those instructions, but that they be executed by 
what some of them referred to as “an authorized painter.” The list 
of authorized painters, who are paid generously for their services, 
is short. Those on that list were selected originally by LeWitt and 
now, after his passing, by his studio. 
With that in mind, consider what a museum or a collector 
purchases when it successfully bids on a LeWitt wall drawing. It is 
something whose standard use (i.e., displaying it on a wall) requires 
 
 281. PERZANOWSKI & SCHULTZ, supra note 274, at 1–2 (recounting how Amazon 
removed all “purchased” copies of an e-book from all users’ Kindle devices and pointing out 
that this control cannot be exercised by sellers of physical books). 
 282. LeWitt’s wall drawings are often sold for more than $100,000. See, e.g., SOTHEBY’S 
(May 15, 2014, 9:30 AM) [hereinafter SOTHEBY’S 2014], http://www.sothebys.com/en/ 
auctions/ecatalogue/2014/contemporary-art-day-sale-n09142/lot.503.html (wall drawing 
sold for $437,000); SOTHEBY’S (Nov. 15, 2018, 10:00 AM),  http://www.sothebys.com/en/ 
auctions/ecatalogue/2018/contemporary-art-day-sale-n09933/lot.109.html (wall drawing 
sold for $362,500). 
 283. Karol, supra note 128, at 187. Those instructions are commonly available online. 
See, e.g., SOTHEBY’S 2014, supra note 282 (posting the full instructions, which were sold  
for $437,000). 
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close supervision from the seller. It subjects the buyer to a host of 
post-sale restrictions on its core interest in the item purchased. The 
case of Sol LeWitt is not unique. As explored in section III.B, artists 
routinely exercise post-sale control over the use of their sold works. 
Therefore, the notion that a sale of chattel terminates the link 
between the seller and the item sold—a view that the common law 
and the Supreme Court maintain284—is inconsistent with the social 
norms of the multibillion-dollar art industry. Participants in this 
industry perceive the buyer as the owner of the work and expect 
the buyer to be able to exercise many of the rights that are incidental 
to ownership, such as the right of alienation. Nevertheless, that 
does not mean that the ownership interest is not encumbered  
as a result of the social norms that grant artists-sellers certain  
post-sale rights. 
As explained, idiosyncratic rights against the world, including 
post-sale restrictions, might increase the transaction costs in the 
marketplace.285 The art world industry insiders, as a relatively 
close-knit group, might be able to mitigate those costs, but not 
eliminate them. The norms of the industry, and the decision-
making power they give to artists and their heirs, are likely well 
known to all industry participants. Therefore, those insiders do not 
expend resources in exploring whether the norms exist or not.286 
However, the norms are flexible,287 which means, inter alia, that 
different works are subject to different limitations.288 Investigating 
those norms is apparently a cost that this industry is willing to bear 
in order to serve its other priorities, such as faithfully representing 
the creator’s artistic intent. 
Indeed, it seems there is a tension between the theory of private 
property ownership as a well-defined, static set of rights, which 
does not allow sellers to exercise post-case control, and the reality 
 
 284. Supra note 264 and accompanying text. 
 285. See supra text accompanying note 276. 
 286. Cf. Rub, supra note 48, at 794–95 (suggesting how to calibrate the rules of copyright 
exhaustion to reduce transaction costs in transactions involving uninformed consumers, but 
allow greater personalization of rights where sophisticated parties are involved). 
 287. See supra Section III.C (discussing the flexible nature of the social norms 
concerning post-sale control). 
 288. See supra notes 168–69 and accompanying text (comparing Felix Gonzales-Torres’s 
vague instructions, which provide curators with significant discretion when installing his 
work, with Sol LeWitt’s detailed instructions, which restrict the curators’ discretion and set 
forth multiple procedures concerning the installation of the work). 
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of the modern marketplace and its social norms. Going forward, the 
law might need to adopt a more flexible approach to ownership 
that better corresponds with the norms in multiple industries  
and contexts. Future research will be able to use social norms  
to further inform private property laws and to explore the best 
ways to duplicate their flexibility while maintaining enough 
standardization to keep transaction costs at bay. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Museums and similar institutions are willing to pay millions for 
a form of ownership-like interest that the law does not recognize 
because they are bound by the strong social norms of the art world. 
This web of norms, which this Article explores, provides artists 
with a set of powerful rights that only partly overlap with the 
existing legal framework for protecting and incentivizing 
creativity. Those norms guarantee the artists’ central role in the art 
world and effectively and efficiently incentivize types of creativity 
that our legal system does not, such as the creation of certain  
public ideas. 
This Article analyzes those social norms and shows how they 
shed light on broader concepts and their underlying assumptions, 
including our notion of copyright authorship and core principles 
within our perception of private property ownership. The Article 
suggests how the law might need to develop in order to account for 
these richer understandings. 
 
